diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 9d4393a..a686523 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Streamable HTTP; the v0.3 `guard` proxy adds deterministic runtime *result* insp ## [Unreleased] +## [2.1.0] — 2026-10-23 + ### Pagination (DSE-1539) - `pin` and `check` take `--max-pages N` (default 256, `MAX_LIST_PAGES`): a list call @@ -559,7 +561,8 @@ v1-strong foundation. Highlights of the 0.3.0 → 1.0.0 arc: declared surface, RFC 8785 (JCS) + SHA-256 canonicalization, SARIF output, and a live integrity-gate workflow with committed `clean.warden.lock`. -[Unreleased]: https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/compare/v1.1.0...HEAD +[Unreleased]: https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/compare/v2.1.0...HEAD +[2.1.0]: https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/compare/v2.0.0...v2.1.0 [1.1.0]: https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/compare/v1.0.1...v1.1.0 [1.0.1]: https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/compare/v1.0.0...v1.0.1 [1.0.0]: https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/releases/tag/v1.0.0 diff --git a/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md b/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md index 1729b3d..2a8cf00 100644 --- a/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md +++ b/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md @@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ scope-honesty box and makes no compliance/regulatory claim. | [`docs/SPEC.md`](docs/SPEC.md) | **MCP Lock Format v1** — the vendor-neutral, self-contained format specification any tool can implement: on-disk `warden.lock` schema, RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, SHA-256 `sha256:` hashing, `overall_digest` construction, the normative drift class + severity table, the optional per-tool inspection block, and a Conformance section (§12.1: passing `vectors/` **is** conformance) + worked example. `WARDEN_LOCK_SCHEMA.md` is the mcp-warden implementation of this format | | [`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md) | **(v0.1)** Positioning, trust model (TOFU + `--approve`), assets/actors, the four threat classes (MCP-DRIFT / MCP-CAPSURF / MCP-SECRET / MCP-SUPPLY), explicit out-of-scope limits, deliberate cuts | | [`docs/THREAT_MODEL_V2.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL_V2.md) | **(v0.2)** Addendum extending the v0.1 model: T-RESULT vectors, the defends (BLOCK) / monitors (fuzzy) / still-does-NOT-defend (T-BEHAVE) table, runtime trust-model notes, retained + added cuts, shadow-default positioning | -| [`docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md`](docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md) | **(DSE-714, design contract)** Normative invariants for the future deterministic Agent Trust Kernel: trust boundaries, complete mediation, default deny, non-overridable critical classes, evidence-before-effect, offline operation, residual risks, and bindings for DSE-715 through DSE-717. MCP-Warden 2.0.0 is explicitly not yet ATK-conformant | +| [`docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md`](docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md) | **(DSE-714, design contract)** Normative invariants for the future deterministic Agent Trust Kernel: trust boundaries, complete mediation, default deny, non-overridable critical classes, evidence-before-effect, offline operation, residual risks, and bindings for DSE-715 through DSE-717. MCP-Warden 2.1.0 is explicitly not yet ATK-conformant | | [`docs/CONTENT_ENVELOPE.md`](docs/CONTENT_ENVELOPE.md) | **(DSE-715, implemented foundation)** Strict immutable V1 content envelope, domain-separated exact-byte digests, canonical metadata boundary, bounded one-hop lineage, monotonic taint, stable code-only errors, and secret-safe public projection. Evidence only; no authority or whole-ATK conformance claim | | [`docs/POLICY_ENFORCEMENT.md`](docs/POLICY_ENFORCEMENT.md) | **(DSE-716, implemented foundation)** Versioned signed policy/runtime/adapter/executable-bundle activation, exact adapter/bundle-bound leases, mechanically derived frozen handler identity, deterministic default-deny PDP, evidence-gated structural PEP, stable reason/recovery matrix, caps, and non-optional fixed-corpus adapter harness. Separate DSE-717 V2 evidence foundation; real protected-platform and live-guard gates remain pending | -| [`docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md`](docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md) | **(DSE-717, development foundation)** Independently authorized signed receipts, strict strengthening rules and finite noncritical overrides; separate primary/fallback logs, protected-state/latch ports, authenticated recovery, pure historical replay, current eligibility, safe projections and nonoptional reference conformance. Reference providers cannot establish platform rollback resistance; absent from PyPI 2.0.0 | +| [`docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md`](docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md) | **(DSE-717, development foundation)** Independently authorized signed receipts, strict strengthening rules and finite noncritical overrides; separate primary/fallback logs, protected-state/latch ports, authenticated recovery, pure historical replay, current eligibility, safe projections and nonoptional reference conformance. Reference providers cannot establish platform rollback resistance; first published in 2.1.0 | | [`docs/WARDEN_LOCK_SCHEMA.md`](docs/WARDEN_LOCK_SCHEMA.md) | **mcp-warden implementation of [`docs/SPEC.md`](docs/SPEC.md) (MCP Lock Format v1).** `warden.lock` format, RFC 8785 canonicalization + SHA-256 hashing, field/entry/overall digests, the normative drift definition + severities; **§5.1/§6.2 structural schema diff** (normalized per-tool `schema_skeleton`, `schema_version` 4 — annotations/output added at v4, skeleton added at v2, in-document `$ref` resolution at v3 (#29), granular `WRD-DRIFT-SCHEMA-*` taxonomy + severities, v1 fallback); **§8.1/§8.2 (v0.3, #19)** structured out-of-digest provenance (`pinner` / `attestations` / `rotation_count`, `PROVENANCE_VERSION`, B4 `bound_digest` format) + `lock rotate` digest-invariant semantics + the #16 signing implication; **§11 (v0.2)** optional per-tool inspection policy (`expected_output_charset` / `may_return_urls` / `secret_echo_applies`, fail-safe defaults, digest impact) | | [`docs/WARDEN_LOCK_EXAMPLE.md`](docs/WARDEN_LOCK_EXAMPLE.md) | Illustrative full `warden.lock` + a post-`lock rotate` `pin` block (archived from WARDEN_LOCK_SCHEMA §9 to keep that core doc under the line cap) | | [`docs/CHECKS.md`](docs/CHECKS.md) | The deterministic `WRD-*` static-check catalog (capability/secret/supply/robustness), the shared tokenizer, severity→SARIF mapping, redaction rule, CUT list. **Reused by v0.2** `WRD-RES-SECRET-ECHO` (the `WRD-SEC-*` patterns + redaction) | @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ scope-honesty box and makes no compliance/regulatory claim. | Doc | Purpose | |-----|---------| | [`RELEASING.md`](RELEASING.md) | Operator runbook: existing-project PyPI publisher settings, authentication-only verification, release delivery, post-release checks, failed-job recovery and rollback/yank. PyPI dist name is `mcp-warden-cli`; CLI/repo stay `mcp-warden`. | -| [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md) | Keep-a-Changelog history through CLI 2.0.0 / schema level 4 with explicit in/out-of-scope. | +| [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md) | Keep-a-Changelog history through CLI 2.1.0 (schema level 4) with explicit in/out-of-scope. | | [`.github/workflows/release.yml`](.github/workflows/release.yml) | Publish-on-Release: build Python + tested TypeScript tarball; upload only Python through OIDC (repo gate + `skip-existing`); Sigstore-sign artifacts/checksums. Manual `verify-pypi` exchanges credentials without build/upload/signing. The gate variable alone does not prove publisher alignment. | | [`scripts/verify_pypi_oidc.py`](scripts/verify_pypi_oidc.py) | Standard-library OIDC probe: reviewed-main binding, owner inspection acknowledgment, bounded HTTPS, no redirects/token logs/storage/uploads. PyPI minting can mutate pending records; exchange does not prove project upload permission. | | [`docs/plans/2026-10-02-pypi-automation-repair.md`](docs/plans/2026-10-02-pypi-automation-repair.md) | Bounded automation repair and session wrap plan, including the authenticated PyPI browser boundary. | diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b04f942..318c167 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The opt-in [artifact trust foundation](docs/ARTIFACT_TRUST.md) adds public-key verification for the existing kernel activation APIs and `trust` CLI commands to prepare unsigned review artifacts and verify external signatures. Keys and signer roles require an independently protected root pin. This development -feature is not in the published 2.0.0 package. The development +feature first ships in the 2.1.0 package. The development [decision receipt foundation](docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md) adds signed evidence, governed decisions and recovery ports. Live checkpoint enforcement still requires an independently protected platform provider and DSE-1076 guard integration. @@ -455,8 +455,8 @@ V1's default evidence gate denies effects. DSE-717 adds a separate V2 PEP with i authorized signed receipts, strengthening rules, finite noncritical overrides, primary/fallback logs, protected-state/recovery ports, pure replay and a mandatory reference failure corpus. Reference providers prove local durability and fail-closed ordering; they cannot establish -platform rollback resistance or whole-kernel conformance. These development APIs are absent -from the published 2.0.0 package. See [`docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md`](docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md), +platform rollback resistance or whole-kernel conformance. These development APIs first ship +in the 2.1.0 package. See [`docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md`](docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md), [`docs/POLICY_ENFORCEMENT.md`](docs/POLICY_ENFORCEMENT.md) and [`docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md`](docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md). diff --git a/docs-site/artifact-trust.md b/docs-site/artifact-trust.md index c87c572..7ff94a8 100644 --- a/docs-site/artifact-trust.md +++ b/docs-site/artifact-trust.md @@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ The development branch adds public-key signature verification for Agent Trust Kernel policy, runtime, adapter, and executable-bundle artifacts. This feature -is not included in the published **2.0.0** package. Install a reviewed Git commit -with the `artifact-trust` extra to use it. +first ships in the **2.1.0** package. Install it with the `artifact-trust` extra +(`pip install 'mcp-warden-cli[artifact-trust]'`). It prepares unsigned review artifacts and verifies external Ed25519 signatures. The separate [decision receipt foundation](decision-receipts.md) adds evidence diff --git a/docs-site/decision-receipts.md b/docs-site/decision-receipts.md index f99d2f9..e479416 100644 --- a/docs-site/decision-receipts.md +++ b/docs-site/decision-receipts.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ The development SDK adds signed evidence for agent security decisions. A receipt binds the reviewed authority, exact request, effective decision, execution identity -and evidence sequence. This feature is not included in the published **2.0.0** +and evidence sequence. This feature first ships in the **2.1.0** package, and the existing `guard` command does not yet enforce these checkpoints. ## Keep approval outside untrusted inputs diff --git a/docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md b/docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md index 025752c..b16f1ed 100644 --- a/docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md +++ b/docs/AGENT_TRUST_KERNEL.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ whole-kernel conformance remains pending protected-platform and live adapter gat **Scope:** Deterministic reference monitor beneath agents and protocol adapters. **Document owner:** Security. Changes require threat-model review. -> **Current-product boundary:** MCP-Warden 2.0.0 does **not** claim conformance with this +> **Current-product boundary:** MCP-Warden 2.1.0 does **not** claim conformance with this > contract. Its shipped `guard` runtime intentionally has opt-outs and fail-open paths, and > it does not yet provide universal provenance, complete mediation, bounded authority, or > evidence-before-effect. Those differences remain honest product limits until downstream @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ probes per registered operation. It scans actual artifact bytes and safe output passing report states `platform_status=unsupported` and `atk_conformant=false`: process-local protected state and file durability cannot resist restoration of the entire host snapshot. No production protected platform provider or DSE-1076 live `guard` integration ships in this wave. -These development features remain absent from the published 2.0.0 package. +These development foundations first ship in the 2.1.0 package; that is not ATK conformance. ## 11. Conformance gates diff --git a/docs/ARTIFACT_TRUST.md b/docs/ARTIFACT_TRUST.md index b9a1ad5..fe8e7d6 100644 --- a/docs/ARTIFACT_TRUST.md +++ b/docs/ARTIFACT_TRUST.md @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ state, or establish whole-kernel conformance. ## Trust and key custody -Install this development branch with the `artifact-trust` extra. The published -2.0.0 package does not include this feature. No signing command, private-key +Install 2.1.0 or later with the `artifact-trust` extra (`mcp-warden-cli[artifact-trust]`); +the 2.0.0 package does not include this feature. No signing command, private-key loader, or key generator exists in the product. Use an independently governed external signing service or signing station; keep its private signing capability outside agent/tool access. The external signer must review the canonical diff --git a/docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md b/docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md index f54e9db..9393870 100644 --- a/docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md +++ b/docs/DECISION_RECEIPTS.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ DSE-717 adds a protocol-neutral SDK foundation over the existing content-envelop policy, runtime, adapter and executable-bundle contracts. It records a governed security decision before the registered handler receives an allowed effect. The historical `guard` proxy keeps its existing behavior; DSE-1076 owns live integration. -This development feature is not included in the published 2.0.0 package. +This development feature first ships in the 2.1.0 package. The intended human checkpoint approves an exact reviewed version and its bounded actions until either changes. The trust boundary includes an externally governed diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index f83bed1..0ecdaba 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ # `mcp-warden` — install `mcp-warden-cli`, then run `mcp-warden ...`. See README # impostor warning + CHANGELOG. name = "mcp-warden-cli" -version = "2.0.0" +version = "2.1.0" description = "CI-first MCP supply-chain integrity gate: pin and verify the declared tool/resource/prompt surface of an MCP server, plus runtime tool-result inspection (guard/inspect)." readme = "README.md" requires-python = ">=3.11" diff --git a/src/mcp_warden/__init__.py b/src/mcp_warden/__init__.py index 31a6aba..51a4a0a 100644 --- a/src/mcp_warden/__init__.py +++ b/src/mcp_warden/__init__.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ on runtime tool behavior or tool results. See ``docs/THREAT_MODEL.md``. """ -__version__ = "2.0.0" +__version__ = "2.1.0" #: Lock schema version. Bumped 3 → 4 for annotation/outputSchema commitments #: (DSE-1539). Missing/null metadata hashes JSON null, not an empty object. #: Earlier 2 → 3 migration was #29 (in-document ``$ref`` resolution in