diff --git a/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md b/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md index 82a8587..f80c0e9 100644 --- a/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md +++ b/DOCUMENTATION_INDEX.md @@ -328,4 +328,5 @@ review/signature CLI. Tests are `tests/test_artifact_trust.py`, | Date | Change | |------|--------| +| 2026-11-14 | Shipped DSE-718 in v2.3.0; normal company OIDC upload, matching GitHub/PyPI hashes, verified signatures/provenance and installed CLI smoke. See [release proof](RELEASING.md#normal-release-proof--2026-11-14). Manual fallback retained. README operator examples preserved in [archive](docs/archive/2026-11-14-readme-operations.md). | | 2026-11-06 | Recorded TheDataExperts PyPI ownership, Active organization billing, normal company publisher and removal of the obsolete personal publisher; linked successful authentication-only run 42224199909. Account-wide token revoked; project-only manual fallback retained. No upload today; 2.2.0 unchanged and next normal release upload/provenance proof outstanding. | diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index da2e8b2..33494fe 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ Hints are server claims, not proof of safety, and schemas do not certify content operators can check production OIDC without uploading via [`RELEASING.md`](RELEASING.md). `mcp-warden-cli` is owned by the [TheDataExperts PyPI organization](https://pypi.org/org/TheDataExperts/). -The company-repository publisher passed an authentication-only check on 2026-11-06; -that check uploaded no package. The next normal release must prove OIDC upload -and provenance; see the [publishing status](RELEASING.md#ownership-and-publishing-status--2026-11-06). +The normal [v2.3.0 release](https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/releases/tag/v2.3.0) +uploaded through the company Trusted Publisher, with matching GitHub/PyPI artifact +hashes, verified signatures and PyPI provenance. See the +[release proof](RELEASING.md#normal-release-proof--2026-11-14). The proposed next direction is a protocol-neutral **Warden**: human-approved tool versions and bounded actions, with untrusted inputs kept separate from authority. The [upgrade plan and checkpoint proposal](docs/plans/2026-10-02-tool-integrity-upgrade.md) @@ -454,16 +455,8 @@ failure codes and `--require-consensus`. ## Policy (design-time only) -`policy` **lints** a YAML policy and **evaluates a single provided sample call**. -It does **not** intercept live calls — there is no runtime enforcement in v0.1 -(deferred to v0.2). Fail-closed defaults: `shell_exec.allow=false`, -`http_request.deny_private=true` (SSRF ranges), `sql_query.allow_readonly_only=true`, -empty `allow_paths` = deny-all. See [`docs/POLICY_MODEL.md`](docs/POLICY_MODEL.md). - -```bash -.venv/bin/mcp-warden policy eval policy.yaml ssrf_sample.json -# -> deny: host 169.254.169.254 is in deny_private range 169.254.0.0/16 (exit 1) -``` +`policy` lints YAML and evaluates a supplied sample call; it does not intercept live calls. +See [the contract](docs/POLICY_MODEL.md) and [operator examples](docs/archive/2026-11-14-readme-operations.md#policy-design-time-only). --- @@ -489,21 +482,9 @@ schemas in `warden.lock` and the SARIF output match them byte-for-byte. ## Tests -```bash -PATH="$PWD/.venv/bin:$PATH" .venv/bin/python -m pytest -q -``` - -The headline test is a real stdio round-trip: spawn the clean fixture → `pin` → -re-run `check` against the mutated fixture → assert non-zero exit + the expected -drift + SARIF finding. - -The live runtime attack surface — the stdio JSON-RPC **framer**, the ANSI/control -**stripper**, the exfil-**domain** matcher, and the secret **redactor** — is -additionally **property-fuzzed** with [`hypothesis`](https://hypothesis.works/) -under `tests/fuzz/` (construction-based liveness + soundness properties: a -known-malicious input IS detected, and the parser never invents, leaks, or -misclassifies). The deep soak runs via `make fuzz`; see -[`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md#fuzzing). +Run `.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q`; see [test details](docs/archive/2026-11-14-readme-operations.md#tests) +and [fuzzing](CONTRIBUTING.md#fuzzing). Normalization additionally requires the +[actual-image qualification](docs/CONTENT_NORMALIZATION.md#qualification-and-rollback). ## Contributing & security diff --git a/RELEASING.md b/RELEASING.md index e55be5a..6c3d105 100644 --- a/RELEASING.md +++ b/RELEASING.md @@ -67,10 +67,35 @@ exchange; build, signing and upload jobs were skipped. This establishes authenti not project upload permission or successful release publication. The account-wide upload token was revoked. A `mcp-warden-cli`-only manual fallback -is retained pending the next normal release's successful OIDC upload and provenance -verification. It is not a workflow fallback. No upload or release was performed on -2026-11-06; the published version remains **2.2.0**. Keep the next-release proof -outstanding until section 2 confirms the new version and attestations. +remains retained and is not a workflow fallback. No upload or release was performed +on 2026-11-06; the published version was then **2.2.0**. The normal release below +now supplies upload/provenance proof. Retiring the fallback remains separately gated. + +### Normal release proof — 2026-11-14 + +[v2.3.0](https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/releases/tag/v2.3.0) +was published from reviewed merge `8c8b59c58ff90402354187058f2e5e4b42fd49f0`. +[Release run 43605647867](https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/actions/runs/43605647867) +succeeded in build, production PyPI OIDC upload and Sigstore signing/self-verification. +GitHub release assets and [PyPI 2.3.0](https://pypi.org/project/mcp-warden-cli/2.3.0/) +contain identical package bytes: + +| Artifact | SHA-256 | +|---|---| +| `mcp_warden_cli-2.3.0-py3-none-any.whl` | `fc1acd2ce66fb5e1b10697473bc7693a3b745478a7ac71a3cf39d5a1e2779146` | +| `mcp_warden_cli-2.3.0.tar.gz` | `7e1876bae5e7a936faf1c329dd85fb9d95169f1394f7040649c9ffec2c05d2ae` | + +The [wheel provenance](https://pypi.org/integrity/mcp-warden-cli/2.3.0/mcp_warden_cli-2.3.0-py3-none-any.whl/provenance) +and [sdist provenance](https://pypi.org/integrity/mcp-warden-cli/2.3.0/mcp_warden_cli-2.3.0.tar.gz/provenance) +identify GitHub repository `DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden`, workflow +`release.yml`, environment `null`. Release assets include their Sigstore bundles. +A fresh Linux Python 3.12 environment installed the downloaded wheel and exercised +the qualified worker: safe text exits 0, unknown MIME refuses with exit 2, an +encoded injection phrase is detected at its configured monitor tier, and a +synthetic token blocks with exit 1 while remaining redacted. + +This proves a normal company-publisher release upload and installed CLI use. +It does not prove fallback-token retirement or whole-kernel conformance. ### New projects only — pending publisher diff --git a/SYSTEM_CONTEXT_DIAGRAM.md b/SYSTEM_CONTEXT_DIAGRAM.md index 2ba2206..075c9b2 100644 --- a/SYSTEM_CONTEXT_DIAGRAM.md +++ b/SYSTEM_CONTEXT_DIAGRAM.md @@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ flowchart LR > the company-repository publisher subsequently passed the 2026-11-06 > authentication-only check ([run 42224199909](https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/actions/runs/42224199909)). > `mcp-warden-cli` now belongs to the [TheDataExperts PyPI organization](https://pypi.org/org/TheDataExperts/). -> That authentication-only check uploaded no package. End-to-end OIDC upload -> and provenance require proof from the next normal release. See [`RELEASING.md`](RELEASING.md). +> The normal [v2.3.0 release run](https://github.com/DataScience-EngineeringExperts/mcp-warden/actions/runs/43605647867) +> subsequently built, OIDC-uploaded and Sigstore-signed the package. GitHub/PyPI +> artifact hashes match; PyPI provenance identifies the company repository and +> `release.yml`. The manual fallback remains retained; retirement is separate. +> See [`RELEASING.md`](RELEASING.md#normal-release-proof--2026-11-14). --- diff --git a/docs/archive/2026-11-14-readme-operations.md b/docs/archive/2026-11-14-readme-operations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..813c1e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/archive/2026-11-14-readme-operations.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# README operator examples archived 2026-11-14 + +Preserved from the README to keep its overview bounded. Run the commands below +from the repository root. + +## Policy (design-time only) + +`policy` **lints** a YAML policy and **evaluates a single provided sample call**. +It does **not** intercept live calls — there is no runtime enforcement in v0.1 +(deferred to v0.2). Fail-closed defaults: `shell_exec.allow=false`, +`http_request.deny_private=true` (SSRF ranges), `sql_query.allow_readonly_only=true`, +empty `allow_paths` = deny-all. See [`docs/POLICY_MODEL.md`](../POLICY_MODEL.md). + +```bash +.venv/bin/mcp-warden policy eval policy.yaml ssrf_sample.json +# -> deny: host 169.254.169.254 is in deny_private range 169.254.0.0/16 (exit 1) +``` + +--- + +## Tests + +```bash +PATH="$PWD/.venv/bin:$PATH" .venv/bin/python -m pytest -q +``` + +The headline test is a real stdio round-trip: spawn the clean fixture → `pin` → +re-run `check` against the mutated fixture → assert non-zero exit + the expected +drift + SARIF finding. + +The live runtime attack surface — the stdio JSON-RPC **framer**, the ANSI/control +**stripper**, the exfil-**domain** matcher, and the secret **redactor** — is +additionally **property-fuzzed** with [`hypothesis`](https://hypothesis.works/) +under `tests/fuzz/` (construction-based liveness + soundness properties: a +known-malicious input IS detected, and the parser never invents, leaks, or +misclassifies). The deep soak runs via `make fuzz`; see +[`CONTRIBUTING.md`](../../CONTRIBUTING.md#fuzzing). +