diff --git a/docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile.mdx b/docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile.mdx index a9d602ce953..cf6b9104277 100644 --- a/docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile.mdx +++ b/docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile.mdx @@ -272,6 +272,22 @@ The vectors live at `static/compliance/source/test-vectors/wba-profile/` and are The keys in `keys.json` are public test keys with published private seeds. Section 6.8 says test keys "MUST NOT be used in production", and verifiers SHOULD reject them when detected. The README in the vector directory describes the file format and the harness state each vector needs. +## Try it against the training agent + +The training agent runs this profile end to end at `https://test-agent.adcontextprotocol.org/sales/identity/mcp`. It verifies Web Bot Auth signatures, binds a signer through open sandbox onboarding (`sync_principal`), and checks [demand-side grants](/docs/building/by-layer/L2/accounts-and-agents#grants-in-trust-records-experimental) in the brand's house trust.json before any account or spend. Unsigned callers can only discover it (`get_adcp_capabilities`), and its capabilities advertise `request_signing.profiles: ["web-bot-auth"]` and `account.agent_onboarding.sandbox.mode: "open"`. + +Only the route's fictional fixture identities resolve. Their documents are served in-process, and every real domain is refused. Sign as one of these agents with its published key from [`fixture-world.ts`](https://github.com/adcontextprotocol/adcp/blob/main/server/src/training-agent/identity33/fixture-world.ts): + +| Agent origin | Who it is | What a `sync_accounts` for brand `nova-motors-7k3q.com` (brand ID `nova_motors`) shows | +|---|---|---| +| `https://buyer.pinnacle-agency-7k3q.com` | An agency the house granted media buying for Nova Motors in the US and GB | Accepted through the parent's grant. Nova Motors publishes no trust.json of its own. A market outside the grant is refused. | +| `https://buyer.nova-brands-7k3q.com` | The house's own buying agent | Accepted with implicit authority when the account operator is `nova-brands-7k3q.com`; no grant needed | +| `https://buyer.quickmedia-7k3q.com` | An impostor with no grant | `PERMISSION_DENIED`, `grant_absent`, whichever operator it names | + +A brand of `offline-brand-7k3q.com` exercises an unavailable trust record: spend fails closed with `SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE`. + +The fixture keys are published sandbox keys, like `keys.json`: anyone can sign as these fictional agents, and the training agent trusts them only for these origins and only for sandbox accounts. Never trust them anywhere else. The route is experimental and may change with the profile. + ## References - [HTTP Message Signatures for automated traffic, draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol/00/) diff --git a/fly.toml b/fly.toml index 77d5a222434..37bf480488b 100644 --- a/fly.toml +++ b/fly.toml @@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ primary_region = 'iad' ADDIE_ROUTER_LUNA_SHADOW_HMAC_KEY_VERSION = "governance-pilot-v1" # AdCP 3.2 beta is public; expose the deterministic proposal-negotiation labs. ENABLE_ADCP_3_2_PROPOSAL_PROFILES = "true" + # Experimental AdCP 3.3 identity lab on the training agent: Web Bot Auth, + # open sandbox onboarding, and demand-side trust.json grants at + # /sales/identity/mcp. Only its fictional fixture identities resolve. + ENABLE_ADCP_3_3_IDENTITY_ROUTE = "true" # Deployment-time ceiling for the issue #6827 read-only authorization canary. # The database runtime gate remains independently disabled until explicitly armed. ORG_AUTHORIZATION_ENFORCEMENT_ENABLED = "true" diff --git a/server/src/training-agent/identity33/runtime.ts b/server/src/training-agent/identity33/runtime.ts index f0421e9056a..141079e703c 100644 --- a/server/src/training-agent/identity33/runtime.ts +++ b/server/src/training-agent/identity33/runtime.ts @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import { } from '@adcp/sdk/identity-3.3'; import { verifySignatureAsAuthenticator, type Authenticator } from '@adcp/sdk/server'; import type { AdcpStateStore } from '@adcp/sdk/server'; -import { StaticJwksResolver } from '@adcp/sdk/signing'; +import { StaticJwksResolver, type ReplayStore } from '@adcp/sdk/signing'; import type { IncomingMessage } from 'node:http'; import { accountRefForId } from '../account-handlers.js'; import { mcpOperationResolver } from '../request-signing.js'; @@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ export interface Identity33Runtime { export function createIdentity33Runtime(options: { stateStore: AdcpStateStore; + /** Shared across replicas so a nonce accepted on one machine is refused on the others. */ + replayStore?: ReplayStore; getUrl: (req: IncomingMessage & { rawBody?: string }) => string; }): Identity33Runtime { const fetchOptions = { trustedFetchFn: fixtureFetch }; @@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ export function createIdentity33Runtime(options: { // RFC 9421 keys are not accepted here; only Web Bot Auth identities. jwks: new StaticJwksResolver([]), webBotAuth: { directory, resolvePrincipal }, + ...(options.replayStore && { replayStore: options.replayStore }), getUrl: options.getUrl, resolveOperation: mcpOperationResolver, }); diff --git a/server/src/training-agent/request-signing.ts b/server/src/training-agent/request-signing.ts index ba2ee042154..ccb6ddf85e4 100644 --- a/server/src/training-agent/request-signing.ts +++ b/server/src/training-agent/request-signing.ts @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ export function requestSigningProfileVersion(ctx: SigningRouteContext): RequestS * lose cross-instance replay protection — production must have a pool. */ let _replayStore: ReplayStore | null = null; -function getReplayStore(): ReplayStore { +export function getReplayStore(): ReplayStore { if (_replayStore) return _replayStore; try { _replayStore = new PostgresReplayStore(getPool()); diff --git a/server/src/training-agent/tenants/router.ts b/server/src/training-agent/tenants/router.ts index 683184b4ff8..44b8a032e41 100644 --- a/server/src/training-agent/tenants/router.ts +++ b/server/src/training-agent/tenants/router.ts @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { createLogger } from '../../logger.js'; import { runWithAccountIdAliasScope, runWithSessionContext, flushDirtySessions } from '../state.js'; import { createRegistryHolder, pickStateStore, resolveTenantHost, type RegistryHolder } from './registry.js'; import { createIdentity33Runtime } from '../identity33/runtime.js'; +import { getReplayStore } from '../request-signing.js'; import { advertiseIdentity33Capabilities, requireIdentity33, signedRequestUrl } from '../identity33/route.js'; import { getTrainingGovernanceIssuer } from '../canonical-base.js'; import { @@ -1600,7 +1601,11 @@ export function mountTenantRoutes( } if (tenantIds.includes('sales') && middleware.storyboardCompat?.version !== '3.0' && identity33RouteEnabled()) { - const runtime = createIdentity33Runtime({ stateStore: pickStateStore(), getUrl: signedRequestUrl }); + const runtime = createIdentity33Runtime({ + stateStore: pickStateStore(), + replayStore: getReplayStore(), + getUrl: signedRequestUrl, + }); const identityHolder = createRegistryHolder({ identity33: { authorize: runtime.authorize }, tenantIds: ['sales'] }); parent.options(IDENTITY33_ROUTE, (_req, res) => { setCORSHeaders(res);