From 6e7f523f12aaf1088227cc0c02564b3d505c1e8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: modusensus Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:05:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fix(dsh-mneme): ask the host before answering any HTTP route MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The host-side routes mounted through webServer.register only checked apiToken, and the "open" policy routes never need one — so nothing in the chain ever asked the host whether the request should be allowed. Any page open in a browser could call /list, /search and the rest and read memory data back. Ask ctx.connection.requestRejection(req) first, in the single place every route is registered, and end the response with the host's 403 (fence) or 401 (not signed in) before any memory content is produced. Only undefined falls through to the existing policy check, so the gate lands on new routes automatically. connection is read lazily per request instead of being added to inject: cordis treats inject as all-or-nothing, so listing a service that a headless or older host does not provide would keep the whole plugin from loading. A host without connection, an object without the method, or a read that throws all mean "no gate" — behaviour falls back to exactly what it was, because a missing optional host service must not 401 the panel. The standalone data plane on 8790 (CLI, MCP, serves) never goes through this registrar, so those callers are untouched. Tests 3650 -> 3657; SECURITY.md security-model tables updated in both languages. --- SECURITY.md | 4 +- dsh-mneme/CHANGELOG.md | 8 +++ dsh-mneme/lib/api.js | 32 ++++++++- dsh-mneme/lib/index.js | 5 ++ dsh-mneme/src/api.js | 32 ++++++++- dsh-mneme/src/index.js | 5 ++ dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 8cbfb92e..d09dd397 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ We follow the [CVSS v3.1](https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document The token is a lock on the **write** surface, not a wall around the whole API. -- **The real boundary is loopback + the DSH host listener.** The host-side routes (`/api/dsh-mneme/*`) are mounted on the DSH port, which binds `127.0.0.1` and is fenced by the host against DNS rebinding and cross-site browser requests. That fence does **not** establish identity: any local process, and any page running in the host's own origin, is inside the perimeter. +- **The real boundary is loopback + the DSH host listener.** The host-side routes (`/api/dsh-mneme/*`) are mounted on the DSH port, which binds `127.0.0.1`. Every one of them asks the host for a verdict before doing anything else — `ctx.connection.requestRejection(req)` — so the host's own fence against DNS rebinding and cross-site browser requests applies to this plugin's routes too: a page open in your browser cannot call them, and gets `403` (fence) or `401` (not signed in to the host) instead of memory data. That fence is not identity: any process already running locally, and any page in the host's own origin, is inside the perimeter. When the host provides no `connection` service (headless, an older host, tests), the check is skipped and behaviour falls back to what it was before this gate existed — a missing host service must not 401 the panel. - **Authentication is opt-in and fail-open.** `apiToken` defaults to empty; while it is empty, `isAuthorized()` returns true for every request — reads *and* writes. Setting a token gates the write routes and the sensitive reads; it does not gate plain reads. - **Open reads (no token even when one is configured)**: `GET /`, `/info`, `/version-check`, `/list`, `/recall-stats`, `/search`, `/semantic`, `/semantic/llm-audit`, `/semantic/llm-audit/stats`, `/semantic/consolidation-stats`, `/semantic/graph/*`, `/entities`, `/memories/entities`, `/dream-status`, `/inject-status`, `/inject-preview`, `/pipeline`, `/candidates`, `/diary`, `/diary/entry`, `/diary/library`, `/diary/library/entry`, `/llm-providers`, `/config-keys`, plus the `GET`/`HEAD` branches of `/profile`, `/rules`, `/persona`, `/persona/session`, `/profile-facts`, `/mode`, `/features`, `/commands`, `/nudge`, `/diary/compose`, `/diary/export`, of the two share-receive routes `/receive` and `/receive/undo`, of `/profile-facts/apply`, of the six chorography read routes `/choro/repos`, `/choro/modules`, `/choro/page`, `/choro/search`, `/choro/claims`, `/choro/run` (M1/finale: they read repo-local wiki pages and `choro_*` index tables — not memory rows; with `chorographyEnabled` off they uniformly answer `409 disabled`, the #497 mount-anyway-gate-in-logic pattern), of the two T1 job routes `/choro/t1` and `/choro/t1/status` (same `token-write` shape as `/choro/run`: the only token-exempt branch is a `405`, and the POST itself answers `409 disabled` unless both `chorographyEnabled` and `chorographyT1FromPanel` are on), and of the three `token-write` knowledge-base routes `/kb/collections`, `/kb/ingest` and `/kb/search` (again only a `405` is genuinely open on them, because `needsToken()` exempts `GET`/`HEAD` under `token-write`; the two plain-`token` reads under `/kb/*` stay gated even on `GET`). `/choro/run` is the same shape as `/receive`: a `token-write` route whose GET branch is token-exempt, so the only genuinely open thing on that path is a `405` — the POST write itself stays gated. Treat them as readable by anything local. `/receive` and `/receive/undo` belong on this list even though they write: under the `token-write` policy, `needsToken()` exempts `GET`/`HEAD` from the token, so the only thing genuinely open on those two paths is a `405` — no read branch exists. `/profile-facts/apply` is POST-only for the same reason (its only open branch is a `405`). The `GET` branch of `/profile-facts` stays open even while `profileFactsEnabled` is off: facts survive a switch-off and the panel must be able to show them (same reasoning as `GET /profile`). This section mirrors the policy declarations rather than anyone's intent, which is why a write route shows up under "open reads"; `dsh-mneme/test/security-doc.test.js` compares both lists against the routes actually mounted, in both directions. - **Gated routes (when a token is configured)**: every write — `/create`, `/update`, `/delete`, `/import`, `/bootstrap`, `/vector-config`, `/vector-reindex`, `/runtime/provision`, `/maintenance/reclaim`, `/test-model`, `/conflicts/resolve`, `/profile/extract` (POST-only: one host-LLM call that returns a profile **draft**; other methods get 405 before any side effect), `/profile-facts/apply` (POST-only: per-fact manual corrections from the panel; writes the `profile_facts` tables, never `user_settings`), `/semantic/graph/affective/apply` (POST-only: per-group manual corrections on `affective_context` edges — rename/archive/restore/promote/demote; writes edge metadata plus the `affective_journal` ledger, never `user_settings`; its GET branch is open under the wildcard above — no gated read exists there), `/profile-facts/run` (POST-only, `token` policy like `/profile/extract`: one host-LLM maintenance pass with no read branch; 409 while `profileFactsEnabled` is off), `/scope/promote` (POST-only, plain `token`: re-stamps the `workspace_scope` of selected rows, one at a time, with a `scope_changes` audit row per success — it moves memories out of a hard-walled import area, so an unauthenticated caller must never reach it), `/choro/run` (POST-only: the panel "rebuild skeleton" write path, re-running T0 into the repo's `.chorography/**`; with `chorographyEnabled` off it uniformly answers 409 disabled), `/choro/t1` (POST-only: spawns a real T1 run through the choro CLI — a host-LLM pass that costs money, so it carries its own `chorographyT1FromPanel` switch on top of `chorographyEnabled`), `/choro/t1/status` (the job poll: its `logTail` carries CLI/model output, so it is not a public-repo read like the rest of `/choro/*`), `/kb/collections`, `/kb/search` (POST-only writes; the only token-exempt branch is the `405`, same shape as `/choro/run`), `/kb/ingest` (POST-only: pulls a configured local source into the knowledge base; source-level failures still answer `200` with `ok:false`, which is a result, not a permission), `/kb/docs`, `/kb/doc` (plain `token`: they hand back whatever collection content the user ingested — that is private material, unlike the repo-documentation `/choro/*` reads), `/receive`, `/receive/undo` (the two share-receive routes write into *this* machine's library, which is why they are `token-write`), `/diary/compose` (POST-only: one host-LLM call that writes `/diaries//YYYY-MM-DD.md`; 409 while `diaryEnabled` is off), `/diary/export` (POST-only: copies one entry into the *user's* bound project directory, which is outside every path the plugin otherwise owns — 409 on an existing target unless `overwrite` is explicit), and the non-`GET` branches of `/profile`, `/rules`, `/persona`, `/persona/session`, `/profile-facts`, `/mode`, `/features`, `/commands`, `/nudge` — plus seven reads: `/export`, `/external-api`, `/conflicts`, `/conflicts/ledger` (read-only triage ledger — tier/status/detection timestamps and title-level info, same sensitivity as `/conflicts`), `/health`, `/share`, `/memory/provenance`. `/share` is gated because the share pack is a whole-library read delivered over POST, and it answers 405 to GET — no open read path exists. `/memory/provenance` is gated because it returns the **verbatim raw text** of distilled conversation windows (opt-in via `distillRecords.enabled`); chained with the open list route it would otherwise let any local process enumerate ids and then pull that text back, which reaches the same result as `/export` in a different shape. @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ This project is licensed under the **MIT License**. See [LICENSE](https://github Token 是**写**面上的锁,不是把整个 API 围起来的墙。 -- **真正的边界是回环 + 宿主监听器。** 宿主侧路由(`/api/dsh-mneme/*`)挂在 DSH 端口上,该端口绑 `127.0.0.1`,并由宿主挡掉 DNS rebinding 与跨站浏览器请求。这道围栏**不建立身份**:任何本地进程、以及任何跑在宿主同源页面里的脚本,都在这道围栏之内。 +- **真正的边界是回环 + 宿主监听器。** 宿主侧路由(`/api/dsh-mneme/*`)挂在 DSH 端口上,该端口绑 `127.0.0.1`。**每一条路由在动手之前都先问宿主一句 `ctx.connection.requestRejection(req)`**,所以宿主挡 DNS rebinding 与跨站浏览器请求的那道围栏,对插件的路由同样生效:浏览器里开着的网页调不动它们,拿到的是 `403`(围栏不过)或 `401`(没登录宿主),而不是记忆数据。这道围栏**不建立身份**:任何本地进程、以及任何跑在宿主同源页面里的脚本,都在这道围栏之内。宿主没提供 `connection` 服务时(headless、旧宿主、测试)这道检查跳过,行为退回加它之前的样子——缺一个宿主服务不能让整个面板 401。 - **鉴权是 opt-in 且 fail-open。** `apiToken` 默认为空;为空期间 `isAuthorized()` 对每个请求都返回 true——读和写都放行。配了 token 之后,它守的是写路由与敏感读,不守普通读。 - **开放读(即使配了 token 也不需要)**:`GET /`、`/info`、`/version-check`、`/list`、`/recall-stats`、`/search`、`/semantic`、`/semantic/llm-audit`、`/semantic/llm-audit/stats`、`/semantic/consolidation-stats`、`/semantic/graph/*`、`/entities`、`/memories/entities`、`/dream-status`、`/inject-status`、`/inject-preview`、`/pipeline`、`/candidates`、`/diary`、`/diary/entry`、`/diary/library`、`/diary/library/entry`、`/llm-providers`、`/config-keys`,以及 `/profile`、`/rules`、`/persona`、`/persona/session`、`/profile-facts`、`/mode`、`/features`、`/commands`、`/nudge`、`/diary/compose`、`/diary/export`、`/receive`、`/receive/undo`、`/profile-facts/apply`、`/choro/repos`、`/choro/modules`、`/choro/page`、`/choro/search`、`/choro/claims`、`/choro/run`、`/choro/t1`、`/choro/t1/status`、`/kb/collections`、`/kb/ingest`、`/kb/search` 的 `GET`/`HEAD` 分支。`/choro/run` 与 `/receive` 同款:token-write 的 GET 分支免 token 后真正开放的只有一个 405(它只收 POST),出现在这里是 policy 声明的忠实投影。把它们当作「本地任何东西都能读」。`/receive`、`/receive/undo` 明明是写路由也出现在这一串里,这不是笔误:`token-write` 下 `needsToken()` 对 `GET`/`HEAD` 免 token,所以这两条路径上真正「开放」的只有一个 `405`,压根没有可读分支;`/profile-facts/apply` 同理只收 POST,开放的唯一分支是一个 `405`。`/profile-facts` 的 `GET` 分支在 `profileFactsEnabled` 关着时同样开放:开关关掉后存量事实还在库里,面板要能展示(与 `GET /profile` 同一理由)。`/choro/*` 六条(chorography 仓库地志读侧,M1 + 收尾档)读的是**仓库里的 MD 页与 choro_* 索引表**,不是记忆行——内容是代码仓库的公开文档面,`chorographyEnabled` 关着时统一回 409 disabled(路由挂着、逻辑层挡,#497 先例),不因为开放读而绕过这个闸。这一节照 policy 声明抄、不照意图写,`dsh-mneme/test/security-doc.test.js` 会拿真实装配出来的路由双向比对这两行。 - **受门控的路由(配了 token 之后)**:全部写操作——`/create`、`/update`、`/delete`、`/import`、`/bootstrap`、`/vector-config`、`/vector-reindex`、`/runtime/provision`、`/maintenance/reclaim`、`/test-model`、`/conflicts/resolve`、`/profile/extract`(只收 POST:花一次宿主 LLM 产一段画像**草稿**,其它方法在产生任何副作用之前就 405)、`/profile-facts/apply`(只收 POST:面板的逐条人工修正;写的是 profile_facts 三表,绝不碰 user_settings)、`/semantic/graph/affective/apply`(只收 POST:情绪的逐组人工修正——改词/归档/恢复/升格/降格,作用于 affective_context 边;写的是边的 metadata 加 affective_journal 账本,绝不碰 user_settings;其 GET 分支按上方通配开放,那里没有受门控的读分支)、`/profile-facts/run`(只收 POST,`token` 政策与 `/profile/extract` 同款:一次宿主 LLM 维护轮,无读分支;`profileFactsEnabled` 关着时 409)、`/scope/promote`(只收 POST,`token` 政策:把选中条目的 `workspace_scope` 逐条改写出去,每条成功都落一行 `scope_changes` 审计——它负责把记忆搬出硬墙导入区,绝不能给未鉴权的调用方)、`/choro/run`(只收 POST:面板「重建骨架」的写入口,重跑 T0 落仓库磁盘的 `.chorography/**`——chorographyEnabled 关着时统一 409 disabled)、`/choro/t1`(只收 POST:经 choro CLI 真起一次 T1——一次要花模型额度的宿主 LLM 作业,所以在 `chorographyEnabled` 之上另有一枚 `chorographyT1FromPanel` 闸)、`/choro/t1/status`(任务轮询:`logTail` 里带 CLI 与模型的原始输出,不属 `/choro/*` 其余几条那种「仓库公开文档面」)、`/kb/collections`、`/kb/search`(只收 POST 的写入口,token-write 下真正开放的只有一个 405,与 `/choro/run` 同款)、`/kb/ingest`(只收 POST:把用户配置的本地来源抽进知识库;来源级失败仍回 `200` + `ok:false`,那是结果不是权限)、`/kb/docs`、`/kb/doc`(纯 `token`:回的是用户导进来的集合内容,属私料,与 `/choro/*` 那类仓库文档读侧不同量级)、`/receive`、`/receive/undo`(这两条写的是**本机自己的库**,所以归 `token-write`)、`/diary/compose`(只收 POST:花一次宿主 LLM 写 `/diaries/<项目键>/YYYY-MM-DD.md`;`diaryEnabled` 关着时 409)、`/diary/export`(只收 POST:把某一篇**复制**进用户绑定的项目目录——那是插件本来不拥有的路径,目标已存在时默认 409,要覆盖必须显式传 `overwrite`),以及 `/profile`、`/rules`、`/persona`、`/persona/session`、`/profile-facts`、`/mode`、`/features`、`/commands`、`/nudge` 的非 `GET` 分支——外加七条读:`/export`、`/external-api`、`/conflicts`、`/conflicts/ledger`(矛盾分诊账本的只读面:tier/status/检出时间与标题级信息,与 `/conflicts` 同级——处置由 enforce 档自动完成,行不是待办)、`/health`、`/share`(分享包是「用 POST 递出来的全库读取」,GET 一律 405,没有开放的读分支)、`/memory/provenance`(它回的是蒸馏窗口的**逐字会话原文**,并自 #512 起按窗口带出 `distill_run_id` / `run_type` / `trigger_source` / `run_status` 的运行归因;`distillRecords.enabled` 打开才有;否则把它和上面那个开放的列表路由串起来,任何本地进程都能先枚举 id、再按 id 把那些原文捞回去——可达结果与 `/export`(一次拿全库)同量级,只是换了形状)。 diff --git a/dsh-mneme/CHANGELOG.md b/dsh-mneme/CHANGELOG.md index 4993fe5d..f69d1496 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/dsh-mneme/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,6 +2,14 @@ ## [Unreleased] +- **宿主 HTTP 路由从没问过宿主「这个请求该不该放行」:浏览器里打开的任意网页都能调记忆接口(awesome 市场的条目因此被 maintainer 补了一句安全说明)**。`createRouteRegistrar`(`dsh-mneme/src/api.js:166`)只做 apiToken 判定,而 `open` 策略的路由——`/api/dsh-mneme`、`/info`、`/version-check`、`/list`、`/recall-stats`、`/search`、`/profile` 等——按 `needsToken` 的定义**永不鉴权**,于是这两层之外再没有任何一处问过宿主「这个请求该不该放行」:同机任何进程、以及浏览器里打开的任意网页,都能直接读出这些路由返回的记忆数据。修法是在 handler 最开头、在 apiToken 判定**之前**先问一次 `ctx.connection.requestRejection(req)`——`403`(Host/Origin 围栏不过)或 `401`(未登录宿主)直接结束响应、一个字节记忆内容都不回,只有 `undefined` 才继续走原有的 policy 路径。门控收在 `createRouteRegistrar` 里一次(`gate(req, res)`),新增的每条路由自动带上,不靠各路由自己记得。 + +- **为什么 `inject` 不加 `connection`(这一处别改回去)**。cordis 的 `_refresh()`(`node_modules/@deepseek-ai/cordis/src/fiber.ts:618-626`)是**全或无**:`inject` 里任一登记服务没绑上,整个 fiber 就不激活。把 `connection` 列进去,等于让插件在 headless、旧版宿主、以及任何没 provide connection 的环境上**整个起不来**——用一次可选的安全增强换掉插件本体,这个交换比不成立。所以改成请求时惰性读:`ctx.reflect?.get` 存在就用它取 `connection`,否则退回 `ctx.connection`(`ReflectService.get` 对未 provide 的服务返回 undefined,不抛),取出后还要确认它有 `requestRejection` 方法才用。宿主没提供、方法不存在、读取抛错——三种情况一律按「没有这道检查」处理,行为逐字退回改动之前:**缺一个宿主服务不能让面板 401**,否则还没跟上这一步的宿主会看见一个打不开的记忆面板。 + +- **standalone 数据面与面板都不受影响**。`bin/cli.mjs`、`bin/dsh-mneme-mcp.mjs`、`bin/dsh-mneme-serve.mjs` 走的是 `src/api-standalone.js`(8790,Node `createServer` 自起,**不经** `createRouteRegistrar`),CLI 与 MCP 的用法一字未改;面板自己在宿主同源页面里跑,`apiFetch` 用相对路径 `fetch`、同源请求自带 cookie,本来就在围栏之内。 + + **测试** 3,650 → **3,657**(+7,`test/api.test.js`):connection 回 `403` 时连 `policy: "open"` 的路由也挡下、回 `401` 同样挡下且 body 为空、放行之后 policy 照旧(open 仍开放、token 仍要 token)、宿主没提供 connection 时行为与改动前逐字一致、connection 在但没有 `requestRejection` 方法按「没提供」处理、`createApi` 之后才挂上的 connection 对后续请求仍然生效(这条专门锁住惰性读取,避免有人图省事挪回启动时读一次)、读取 connection 抛错时按未提供处理而不是把请求打成 500。`SECURITY.md` 中英两份的安全模型表同步:§5 首条写明宿主侧路由先问访问检查、页面拿到 403/401 而不是记忆数据,并写清「宿主没提供 connection 时跳过」与「这道围栏**不建立身份**」两处边界。 + - **默认落盘路径把每个人钉在 `~/.dsh` 里:换掉宿主就得换记忆库(#744)**。库的默认目录原先写死成 `~/.dsh/memory`,字面量在源码与 `bin/` 里散着 **9 处**(`src/config.js`、`src/api.js` 三次、`src/candidates.js`、`src/pipeline-nudge.js`、`src/pipeline-observations.js` 两次、`src/diary/dir.js`),三份各自实现的 `expandHome`、`src/index.js` 与 `src/serve.js` 各写一遍的 `~` 展开,运行时与模型缓存也是 `~/.dsh/mneme/{runtime,models}`。后果不是「看着像绑定了」,而是真搬不动:把宿主换掉,人的库就留在老位置,插件到一个新家后看见的是一张空表。这一版把「家」抽成一层:新 `src/paths.js` 里 `MNEME_HOME` 是正式名、`DSH_MNEME_HOME` 降成别名,默认落在 `/.mneme`;`resolveMemoryDir()` 一条链决定最终目录——显式 `memoryDir` > `MNEME_MEMORY_DIR`(别名 `DSH_MNEME_MEMORY_DIR`)> 新家默认,且**判据是「那个目录里有没有 `memory.db`」而不是「目录在不在」**,空壳目录不该把主库挡掉。四个刻意的取舍:**存量必须继续能用**——新家里没有库、老 `~/.dsh/memory` 里有,就继续用老的并打一行 info 说明「可迁可不迁」,改默认值绝不能把现有用户变成一张全新空库(本机实测:`resolveMemoryDir("")` 返回 `D:\DSH\.dsh\memory`、`source: "legacy"`、`hasDb: true`,845.9MB 的库原样留着);**缓存与库用不同的兼容规则**——缓存丢了会重下(200MB 量级)不会丢内容,所以旧目录存在就继续用,避免白白重下一个;**旧目录的位置跟着 `DSH_HOME` 走**(用 `legacyHome()` 算,不再写死 `join(home, ".dsh")`):宿主把家指到别处时,那 200MB 缓存不该被当成不存在而重下。这一条第一版写反了(故意只看 `home` 以免测试被机器的 `DSH_HOME` 带偏),代价是别人的机器上缓存白丢;现在把 `env` 做成显式参数,测试传 `{}` 就能隔掉环境,不用担心被带偏;**两边都有库时按体积判一次,不静默搬家**——这是本版最要紧的一处修正(评审 Amarre 指出):原规则「两边都有库就用新家」分不清「已经迁完的人」和「不小心建了一个」——谁在 `MNEME_HOME` 下跑一次 standalone 或一次测试,新家就长出一个几 MB 的库,下次启动静默选新的,几百 MB 的主库再也读不到,且一条日志都没有。现在新库比旧库小到 **10%** 以下就判为误建,继续用旧库并 `warn` 出两个路径与各自体积(附逃生阀:真迁过去的人显式设 `MNEME_MEMORY_DIR` 即可),体积相当或更大才认作真迁完。这条告警文案与判定收在 `src/paths.js` 的 `explainResolution()`,**宿主 `src/index.js` 与 daemon `src/serve.js` 共用同一份**——误建恰恰常从 daemon/测试那边发生,只在宿主喊等于漏掉一半现场;**不删任何东西**,两个库都在,只是选哪本。**测试** 3,599 → **3,620**(+21,新 `test/paths.test.js`):默认家是中性名、新旧环境变量谁优先、空闲机器落到新家、**旧目录有库就继续用**、旧目录只是空壳仍用新家、**两边都有库且体积相当 → 认新家**、**新库只有 1KB 对着 100KB 主库 → 判误建仍用旧库并报 conflict**、**10% 边界(正好 10% 不算、9.9% 才算)**、**迁移后库更小但同量级(30%)仍认新家**、显式配置永远赢且不看库、运行时与模型缓存沿用旧目录、**旧缓存跟着 `DSH_HOME` 走**、告警文案三档(warn 带两路径与体积、info、正常不吭声)、`expandHome` 口径,最后一条是「**不依赖 DSH 也能跑起来**」的可执行验证——空环境 + 空 home 下走默认值建库、写入一条、按 id 读回,不是「代码里搜不到 dsh 字样」;另有 `test/serve.test.js` 新增一条走 daemon 真实入口的用例:摆出旧家 100KB 真库 + 新家 1KB 空库,断言 daemon 喊了、且写入真落进旧库(直接开旧库按 id 查,不是只看日志)。变异自证六条:把 `MNEME_HOME` 与 `DSH_MNEME_HOME` 的优先序调反 → 优先序用例红;把 `hasDb` 改成只看目录存在 → 空壳目录用例红(主库被空目录挡掉);把旧库兼容整段删掉 → `source: "legacy"` 那条红;把体积判据的阈值改成 0 → 误建与边界两条红;把 `legacyHome()` 换回写死的 `join(home, ".dsh")` → `DSH_HOME` 缓存用例红;把 daemon 的 `explainResolution` 调用删掉 → `serve` 那条红。`bin/` 四个入口同时收口:`cli.mjs` 认 `MNEME_URL`/`MNEME_TOKEN`/`MNEME_CONFIG_DIR`(`DSH_MNEME_*` 仍认、新名优先),`dsh-mneme-serve.mjs` 与 `dsh-mneme-mcp.mjs` 同口径,`dsh-mneme-choro.mjs` 的 `--db` 缺省值改从同一条解析取而不是自己拼字面量。`src/diary/dir.js` 的 `memoryBase` 与 `test/diary.test.js` 相应断言一起改掉——原先那条把 `~/.dsh/memory` 钉成期望值,机器上一有存量库它就会随机器变;现在只断言「与解析器同一答案」。**评审补齐十一处(#744 复审)**:① `dsh-mneme-choro.mjs` 的 `defaultDbPath()` 把 `resolveMemoryDir()` 的返回值直接当字符串传给 `path.join`,Node 24 会抛 TypeError——未传 `--db` 时默认命令根本跑不起来,改取 `.dir`;② `dsh-mneme-serve.mjs` 的 `firstNonEmpty` 返回未 trim 的原值,`MNEME_MEMORY_DIR` 前后带空格时下面 `startsWith("~")` 判据失效、被当相对路径 `resolve`,可能开出一个空库,改为返回 `v.trim()`;③ `paths.js` 新增 `legacyMemoryDirs()`:`DSH_HOME` 与 `~/.dsh` 不是同一个地方时,只认 `legacyHome()` 会宣布「没有旧库」而开新空库,现在把写死的老位置也留作兼容候选并写明优先级;④ `dbBytes()` 原来只量 `memory.db` 主文件,而 store 开了 WAL,已提交数据可能还挂在 `-wal` 里——旧库主文件小、WAL 大时会误判成「新库更大」而静默搬走主库,现在与 `store.js` 的占用统计同口径量主文件 + `-wal` + `-shm`(读不到算 0);⑤ `resolveRuntimeDir` / `resolveModelCacheDir` 原判据是「旧目录存在且新目录不存在才用旧的」,新目录只要是个空壳就赢、旧家那 200MB 缓存白扔重下,改成「旧目录存在就用旧的」;⑥ 默认库搬到 `/memory` 后,`qq-inbox` 从库目录退一级推出的收件箱位置与 onebot 实际写的 `/media/onebot` 错位、日记素材静默读不到,改为三档解析:显式 `diaryInboxDir` > 库旁的老位置(存在才用)> 宿主家下的正式位置;⑦ `src/index.js` 把启动时 `resolveMemoryDir()` 选定的目录钉进给 `createApi` 的配置——`cfg.memoryDir` 是原始配置(没配就是空串),而 `api.js` 的 `/pipeline`、`/candidates`、`/nudge` 每次请求都自己再调一次 `memoryBase(config.memoryDir)`,两边都有库时那个函数按体积重算,启动后旧库长过新库 10 倍就会翻到另一本,store 却还开着这本,旁挂数据写到别人家去;⑧ `test/serve.test.js` 的 `saved` 补齐 `MNEME_MEMORY_DIR` / `DSH_MNEME_MEMORY_DIR` 并 delete,否则开发者本机设了就会绕过双库判断、测试还可能写进真库;⑨ 同处 `rt.dispose()` 未 `await` 就删临时目录,Windows 上有文件锁会删失败并被 catch 吞掉、目录残留,改为 `await`;⑩ `test/diary.test.js` 里保存环境变量的键名与恢复的键名不一致(`MNEME_MEMORY_DIR: process.env.DSH_MNEME_MEMORY_DIR`),删了旧变量却恢复不回来,改成按原名保存;⑪ README 中英文卸载说明补上「用过的每个记忆库目录都要检查删除,包括自定义路径」,并说明新旧目录可能同时存库、只删当前选中的那个另一个还在、以后还可能被重新选中。新增测试 4 条:`paths.test.js` 两条(`DSH_HOME` 与 `~/.dsh` 不同时老位置仍作兼容候选;旧库体积算上 `-wal`/`-shm`)、`runtime-layout.test.js` 一条(旧缓存目录存在就用旧的,空壳新目录不参与判定)、`diary.test.js` 一条(收件箱三档)。变异自证:把 `legacyMemoryDirs()` 退回只认 `legacyHome()` → 兼容候选那条红;把 `dbBytes()` 退回只量主文件 → WAL 那条红;把缓存判据退回 `existsSync(old) && !existsSync(next)` → 旧缓存优先那条红;把收件箱三档退回只从库目录退一级 → 收件箱那条红。 - **想圈一块地单独放导入的会话,圈不住:`auto` 标注根本不是墙(硬墙工作区名单)**。`strictScope` 的硬过滤只对 `workspace_scope_source = 'explicit'` 的行生效(`src/service.js:143`、`:147`,`src/store.js:2008`/`:2011` 与 `:2638`/`:2641` 的 SQL 同口径),而三条写入路径——`memory_save`/`register_document`/`memory_organize` 的 `autoStamping` 与蒸馏的 `writeScope`——落的全是 `auto`。`auto` 只吃软加权(他 scope ×0.5,仍然可见),于是「把一个工作区当成封闭记忆区」这个想法在实现上不成立:实测在内存库上把 `strictScope` 与 `scopeEnabled` 都打开,`isVisibleInScope` 对 auto 跨区返回 `true`、`searchMemories` 从别的项目照样召回、`injectCandidates` 照样注入——**注入面也漏**,不只是检索面。这不是 bug 而是 #170 4.3 的裁决(「auto 不可信」),所以没有改 `isVisibleInScope`、没动 auto 语义,而是走它明说保留的那条通道:新增配置键 `scopeHardWallWorkspaces`(`z.array(z.string()).default([])`),**命中名单的工作区在写入时把 `workspace_scope_source` 落成 `explicit`**,硬过滤从此对它生效。两条落库路径都盖:工具侧三处收成一个 `stampScope` 辅助,蒸馏侧在 `writeScope` 之后单独盖一次——只改工具侧会留下一个由后台任务开着的门。四个刻意的取舍:**名单留空 = 行为逐字节不变**(没有「装了新版就自动圈地」);**比较前去掉末尾分隔符且不分大小写**(值可能来自 registry realpath 或会话 `cwd`,字面比会让墙时灵时不灵);**解析不到非空标签就退回 `auto`**(`normalizeExplicitScope` 会把 `global`/`*`/空白落成 `NULL`,而 `explicit` + `NULL` 是全局可见——那等于把墙拆了);**agent 维不套硬墙**(按工作区圈地,不能让同一 agent 在别的工作区的记忆一起被圈)。配套两条出口:`memory_list` / `/list` / standalone API 加 `workspace_scope` 过滤(**选料清单,不是可见性闸门**——只等值匹配、不看 scope source、不碰 `NULL` 行,`total` 与行同过滤);新增 `POST /scope/promote`(`token`,逐条搬、每条成功落一行 `scope_changes` 审计,非本区 id 回 `not-in-scope` 并报出实际 scope 而不是静默跳过)——「自己挑着搬」不能只删不改标注。**测试** 3,599 → **3,613**(+14:硬墙本体 11 条,评审修复 3 条):三面跨区皆不可见而同区可见(`isVisibleInScope`/`searchMemories`/`injectCandidates`)、名单判定容忍尾分隔符与大小写、`resolveScopeStamp` 四路(含「硬墙遇空标签不许盖章」)、`memory_save` 区内落 `explicit` 而区外落 `auto`、空名单逐字节不变、选料过滤只列那一格且不越过可见性闸门、出库逐条回执加审计、出库异常请求三条(缺 ids / 缺 to / 51 条)、蒸馏区内落 `explicit` 而区外落 `auto`。变异自证四条,每条只让一条用例红:`tools.js` 的 `hardWall` 恒 `false`、`summarize.js` 的 `hardWall` 恒 `false`、`scope.js` 的 `norm` 去掉归一、`store.js` 删掉选料子句。顺带补齐了两处会漂的平价:MCP(`bin/dsh-mneme-mcp.mjs`)与 standalone API 的 `workspace_scope` 入口,以及 `docs/CONFIGURATION.md` 键表、`SECURITY.md` 中英两份受门控清单里的 `/scope/promote`。 diff --git a/dsh-mneme/lib/api.js b/dsh-mneme/lib/api.js index ae34959d..22ed2189 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/lib/api.js +++ b/dsh-mneme/lib/api.js @@ -163,8 +163,23 @@ function needsToken(req, policy, apiToken) { * 唯一的登记入口:校验 policy、拒绝重复路径、把 handler 包上鉴权。 * 返回的 count() 供 createApi 汇报真实路由数(此前的字面量 36 已经和现实脱节)。 */ -export function createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers) { +export function createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers, connectionOf = () => undefined) { const seen = new Set(); + // DSH 的访问检查(Host/Origin 围栏 + 宿主登录 cookie)。浏览器里随便一个网页 + // 都能向 127.0.0.1 发请求,所以「谁能问」不能只靠 apiToken——policy=open 的 + // 路由(信息、列表、检索)同样要过这道门。 + // + // connectionOf 是取值函数而不是取值结果:宿主服务的存续会变,每次请求都重问 + // 一次,才不会把 createApi 那一刻的快照(可能还是 undefined)冻死在这里。 + const gate = (req, res) => { + const connection = connectionOf(); + if (!connection || typeof connection.requestRejection !== "function") return false; + const rejection = connection.requestRejection(req); + if (rejection === undefined) return false; + res.statusCode = rejection; + res.end(); + return true; + }; const register = (route) => { if (!ROUTE_POLICIES.includes(route.policy)) { throw new Error( @@ -177,6 +192,7 @@ export function createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers) { seen.add(key); const inner = route.handler; const handler = (req, res) => { + if (gate(req, res)) return undefined; if (!needsToken(req, route.policy, apiToken)) return inner(req, res); sendJson(res, 401, { error: "unauthorized" }); return undefined; @@ -284,6 +300,18 @@ export function createApi(ctx, service, settings, commands, embedder, semantic = // reflect,退回直接属性访问。createApi 只在有 webServer 时被调用(index.js // 守卫 + 测试 mock),故下方 register 用之非空。 const webServer = typeof ctx.reflect?.get === "function" ? ctx.reflect.get("webServer") : ctx.webServer; + // connection 同上(inject 声明的宿主服务),但**每次请求时才读**:它有可能是 + // 本插件 apply 之后才挂上的,读一次存下来就会永远是 undefined。反射读取本身 + // 也可能在宿主卸载过程中抛错,那种时候按「没提供」处理——缺一道访问检查, + // 好过让面板整体 500。 + const connectionOf = () => { + try { + if (typeof ctx.reflect?.get === "function") return ctx.reflect.get("connection"); + return ctx.connection; + } catch { + return undefined; + } + }; // feature flags 快照(GET/PUT 共用):overrides 是持久化的用户显式覆盖; // effective 是启动配置在白名单键上被 overrides 覆盖后的最终值。config 缺席 @@ -377,7 +405,7 @@ export function createApi(ctx, service, settings, commands, embedder, semantic = } // 所有路由都经这一处登记:policy 必填、鉴权在这里统一判定(见 createRouteRegistrar)。 - const { register, count: countRoutes } = createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers); + const { register, count: countRoutes } = createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers, connectionOf); // /api/dsh-mneme prefix fallback → 404 JSON for unknown sub-paths register({ diff --git a/dsh-mneme/lib/index.js b/dsh-mneme/lib/index.js index 73e86a31..bcb62375 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/lib/index.js +++ b/dsh-mneme/lib/index.js @@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ export const name = "dsh-mneme"; // property without inject" 崩溃)。守卫用 ctx.reflect.get(免 inject 读取, // 未提供返回 undefined)而非 if (ctx.webServer):直接访问未注入属性在 cordis // Proxy 下会抛错而非返回 undefined。 +// 故意**不**把 connection 列进来:cordis 的 inject 是全或无的(_refresh 见到任一 +// 登记服务没有绑上就把整个 fiber 判 inactive),列进来会让 headless / 旧宿主上 +// 整个插件起不来——而访问检查是锦上添花,不是开机前提。改成请求时用 +// ctx.reflect.get("connection") 惰性读(见 api.js 的 connectionOf): +// 有就过 DSH 的 Host/Origin 围栏,没有就退回加这层之前的行为。 export const inject = ["tools", "systemPrompt", "llm", "agentDefaultModel", "commands", "webServer"]; export { Config }; diff --git a/dsh-mneme/src/api.js b/dsh-mneme/src/api.js index ae34959d..22ed2189 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/src/api.js +++ b/dsh-mneme/src/api.js @@ -163,8 +163,23 @@ function needsToken(req, policy, apiToken) { * 唯一的登记入口:校验 policy、拒绝重复路径、把 handler 包上鉴权。 * 返回的 count() 供 createApi 汇报真实路由数(此前的字面量 36 已经和现实脱节)。 */ -export function createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers) { +export function createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers, connectionOf = () => undefined) { const seen = new Set(); + // DSH 的访问检查(Host/Origin 围栏 + 宿主登录 cookie)。浏览器里随便一个网页 + // 都能向 127.0.0.1 发请求,所以「谁能问」不能只靠 apiToken——policy=open 的 + // 路由(信息、列表、检索)同样要过这道门。 + // + // connectionOf 是取值函数而不是取值结果:宿主服务的存续会变,每次请求都重问 + // 一次,才不会把 createApi 那一刻的快照(可能还是 undefined)冻死在这里。 + const gate = (req, res) => { + const connection = connectionOf(); + if (!connection || typeof connection.requestRejection !== "function") return false; + const rejection = connection.requestRejection(req); + if (rejection === undefined) return false; + res.statusCode = rejection; + res.end(); + return true; + }; const register = (route) => { if (!ROUTE_POLICIES.includes(route.policy)) { throw new Error( @@ -177,6 +192,7 @@ export function createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers) { seen.add(key); const inner = route.handler; const handler = (req, res) => { + if (gate(req, res)) return undefined; if (!needsToken(req, route.policy, apiToken)) return inner(req, res); sendJson(res, 401, { error: "unauthorized" }); return undefined; @@ -284,6 +300,18 @@ export function createApi(ctx, service, settings, commands, embedder, semantic = // reflect,退回直接属性访问。createApi 只在有 webServer 时被调用(index.js // 守卫 + 测试 mock),故下方 register 用之非空。 const webServer = typeof ctx.reflect?.get === "function" ? ctx.reflect.get("webServer") : ctx.webServer; + // connection 同上(inject 声明的宿主服务),但**每次请求时才读**:它有可能是 + // 本插件 apply 之后才挂上的,读一次存下来就会永远是 undefined。反射读取本身 + // 也可能在宿主卸载过程中抛错,那种时候按「没提供」处理——缺一道访问检查, + // 好过让面板整体 500。 + const connectionOf = () => { + try { + if (typeof ctx.reflect?.get === "function") return ctx.reflect.get("connection"); + return ctx.connection; + } catch { + return undefined; + } + }; // feature flags 快照(GET/PUT 共用):overrides 是持久化的用户显式覆盖; // effective 是启动配置在白名单键上被 overrides 覆盖后的最终值。config 缺席 @@ -377,7 +405,7 @@ export function createApi(ctx, service, settings, commands, embedder, semantic = } // 所有路由都经这一处登记:policy 必填、鉴权在这里统一判定(见 createRouteRegistrar)。 - const { register, count: countRoutes } = createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers); + const { register, count: countRoutes } = createRouteRegistrar(webServer, apiToken, disposers, connectionOf); // /api/dsh-mneme prefix fallback → 404 JSON for unknown sub-paths register({ diff --git a/dsh-mneme/src/index.js b/dsh-mneme/src/index.js index 73e86a31..bcb62375 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/src/index.js +++ b/dsh-mneme/src/index.js @@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ export const name = "dsh-mneme"; // property without inject" 崩溃)。守卫用 ctx.reflect.get(免 inject 读取, // 未提供返回 undefined)而非 if (ctx.webServer):直接访问未注入属性在 cordis // Proxy 下会抛错而非返回 undefined。 +// 故意**不**把 connection 列进来:cordis 的 inject 是全或无的(_refresh 见到任一 +// 登记服务没有绑上就把整个 fiber 判 inactive),列进来会让 headless / 旧宿主上 +// 整个插件起不来——而访问检查是锦上添花,不是开机前提。改成请求时用 +// ctx.reflect.get("connection") 惰性读(见 api.js 的 connectionOf): +// 有就过 DSH 的 Host/Origin 围栏,没有就退回加这层之前的行为。 export const inject = ["tools", "systemPrompt", "llm", "agentDefaultModel", "commands", "webServer"]; export { Config }; diff --git a/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js b/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js index 865790a2..4a478825 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js +++ b/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js @@ -3026,3 +3026,142 @@ test("POST /diary/compose 两个身份参数都没有时传 null,不假装自 assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200); assert.equal(calls[0].agentId, null, "不知道是谁 ≠ 以为是 default"); }); + +// ── DSH 访问检查(fkysly 在 awesome 条目里点出的那条:只有 apiToken 挡不住 +// 浏览器里任意网页对 127.0.0.1 的请求)。宿主给了 connection 就必须先过 +// requestRejection;没给(headless / 旧宿主 / 测试 mock)则行为退回加这层之前。 + +function setupWithConnection(connection, apiToken = FAKE_API_TOKEN) { + const store = createStore(":memory:"); + const service = createService({ store, mirror: null, config: testConfig({}) }); + const settings = createSettings(store.db); + const commands = { + add: (def) => settings.addCommand(def), + remove: (id) => settings.removeCommand(id), + list: () => settings.listCommands() + }; + const routes = []; + const ctx = { + webServer: { + register(route) { + routes.push(route); + return () => {}; + } + }, + connection + }; + createApi(ctx, service, settings, commands, null, undefined, apiToken, null); + return { routes, service, store }; +} + +const ALLOW_ALL = { requestRejection: () => undefined }; + +test("connection 说 403 时,连 policy=open 的路由也不放行(跨站网页调不动)", async () => { + const seen = []; + const { routes } = setupWithConnection({ + requestRejection(request) { + seen.push(request.url); + return 403; + } + }); + // /api/dsh-mneme/info 是 policy=open:加这层之前它对谁都不设防。 + const route = findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info"); + assert.equal(route.policy, "open", "这条测试的前提就是它 policy=open"); + + const res = new FakeRes(); + await route.handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), res); + assert.equal(res.statusCode, 403); + assert.equal(res.body, "", "被拒时不该回插件数据,也不该回 JSON 错误体"); + assert.equal(seen.length, 1, "requestRejection 恰好被问一次"); +}); + +test("connection 说 401 时同样挡下,且不改写状态码以外的响应", async () => { + const { routes } = setupWithConnection({ requestRejection: () => 401 }); + const res = new FakeRes(); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), res); + assert.equal(res.statusCode, 401); + assert.equal(res.body, ""); +}); + +test("connection 放行后策略照旧:open 直接过,token 仍要 token", async () => { + const { routes } = setupWithConnection(ALLOW_ALL); + + const openRes = new FakeRes(); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), openRes); + assert.equal(openRes.statusCode, 200, "放行后 open 路由行为不变"); + + const noAuth = new FakeRes(); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/memory/provenance") + .handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/memory/provenance?id=x"), noAuth); + assert.equal(noAuth.statusCode, 401, "访问检查不等于鉴权:token 策略还要 token"); + + const authed = new FakeRes(); + const r = req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"); + r.headers = { authorization: `Bearer ${FAKE_API_TOKEN}` }; + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(r, authed); + assert.equal(authed.statusCode, 200); +}); + +test("宿主没提供 connection 时不加检查,行为与加这层之前逐字一致", async () => { + const { routes } = setupWithConnection(undefined); + const res = new FakeRes(); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), res); + assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200, "headless / 旧宿主不能因为拿不到 connection 就整体 401"); +}); + +test("connection 对象在手、但没有 requestRejection 方法时按「没提供」处理", async () => { + const { routes } = setupWithConnection({}); + const res = new FakeRes(); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), res); + assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200); +}); + +test("connection 在 createApi 之后才挂上时,随后的请求仍然过检查(惰性读取)", async () => { + // cordis 里宿主服务的存续会变(重载、后到),createApi 那一刻的快照不能 + // 被冻死:否则先起的面板就永久裸奔。 + const store = { connection: undefined }; + const routes = []; + const ctx = { + reflect: { get: (name) => (name === "webServer" + ? { register(r) { routes.push(r); return () => {}; } } + : store[name]) }, + webServer: { register(r) { routes.push(r); return () => {}; } } + }; + const storeDb = createStore(":memory:"); + const service = createService({ store: storeDb, mirror: null, config: testConfig({}) }); + const settings = createSettings(storeDb.db); + createApi(ctx, service, settings, { add() {}, remove() {}, list: () => [] }, null, undefined, "", null); + + const route = findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info"); + + // 先没有 connection:放行。 + const before = new FakeRes(); + await route.handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), before); + assert.equal(before.statusCode, 200); + + // 之后宿主挂上 connection 并开始拒绝:同一个 handler 必须跟着变。 + store.connection = { requestRejection: () => 403 }; + const after = new FakeRes(); + await route.handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), after); + assert.equal(after.statusCode, 403, "后来挂上的 connection 必须被看到"); +}); + +test("读 connection 抛错时按未提供处理,不让面板 500", async () => { + const routes = []; + const ctx = { + reflect: { + get(name) { + if (name === "webServer") return { register(r) { routes.push(r); return () => {}; } }; + throw new Error("cannot get required service \"connection\" in inactive context"); + } + } + }; + const storeDb = createStore(":memory:"); + const service = createService({ store: storeDb, mirror: null, config: testConfig({}) }); + const settings = createSettings(storeDb.db); + createApi(ctx, service, settings, { add() {}, remove() {}, list: () => [] }, null, undefined, "", null); + + const res = new FakeRes(); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"), res); + assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200, "宿主卸载中的抛错不能变成面板 500"); +}); From 1b71c3346198f03ccfd78243689d570290b47a23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: modusensus Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:18:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] test(dsh-mneme): verify the token half of the gate on a gated route CodeRabbit caught that the "correct credentials still pass" assertion used /info, which is policy=open: even if the gate wrongly rejected every token, that assertion would stay green. Move it to /vector-config (policy=token) so the same block covers both the unauthenticated rejection and the authenticated pass-through. --- dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js b/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js index 4a478825..a51086ea 100644 --- a/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js +++ b/dsh-mneme/test/api.test.js @@ -3095,11 +3095,13 @@ test("connection 放行后策略照旧:open 直接过,token 仍要 token", a .handler(req("/api/dsh-mneme/memory/provenance?id=x"), noAuth); assert.equal(noAuth.statusCode, 401, "访问检查不等于鉴权:token 策略还要 token"); + // 放行 token 的那一半必须在**要 token 的路由**上验:拿 policy=open 的 /info + // 带 token 是自证——就算受门控路由错误地拒掉所有 token,那条断言照样绿。 const authed = new FakeRes(); - const r = req("/api/dsh-mneme/info"); + const r = req("/api/dsh-mneme/vector-config"); r.headers = { authorization: `Bearer ${FAKE_API_TOKEN}` }; - await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/info").handler(r, authed); - assert.equal(authed.statusCode, 200); + await findHandler(routes, "/api/dsh-mneme/vector-config").handler(r, authed); + assert.equal(authed.statusCode, 200, "带正确 token 时受门控路由要放行"); }); test("宿主没提供 connection 时不加检查,行为与加这层之前逐字一致", async () => {