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76b3623
docs(security): add Web Bot Auth request-signing profile (illustrates…
Oct 2, 2026
25dc83f
test(security): add the Web Bot Auth profile vector generator and an …
KonstantinMirin Oct 2, 2026
422d25f
fix(schema): define the webhook signing profile once, as its own enum…
KonstantinMirin Oct 7, 2026
f73f253
test(security): grade the key-purpose rule with governance token vectors
KonstantinMirin Oct 7, 2026
1fc6fd5
docs(security): state which checks the governance vectors fail
KonstantinMirin Oct 8, 2026
1925701
docs(security): state governance tokens as one agent per purpose
KonstantinMirin Oct 8, 2026
ab6a777
docs(security): reference trust.json as merged in #8121
KonstantinMirin Oct 15, 2026
02f79dd
docs(security): match the revised stack on revoked keys and unsigned …
KonstantinMirin Oct 15, 2026
0aa0321
docs(security): recommend 64-byte nonces; a signature short of the pr…
KonstantinMirin Oct 15, 2026
89ed082
docs(security): one profile for standard WBA libraries: 64-byte nonce…
KonstantinMirin Oct 15, 2026
e855cb0
docs(security): drop relays; one Web Bot Auth signature per request
KonstantinMirin Oct 15, 2026
e24eeb0
docs(security): answer a reused signature or nonce with 429, as WBA s…
KonstantinMirin Oct 16, 2026
5c38760
docs(security): sign with Ed25519 only
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
e0b4996
docs(security): accept the two nonce encodings that validateNonce acc…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
bb26685
docs(security): read only the web-bot-auth signature
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
7ca945f
docs(security): state the directory media-type rule, and ignore keys …
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
e58c517
docs(security): move the revocation check and Accept-Signature conten…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
18923cd
test(wba): add the failure scenarios as data
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
b30697c
docs(security): describe the profile update in the changeset
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
d5920c8
docs(security): remove the governance-token checks from the profile
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
f635679
test(wba): add a malformed other-tag member as scenario R20b
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
784aa60
docs(security): state the negative-cache bound once, as at most 60 s
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
cf403e8
docs(security): say which outcome each AdCP check after WBA verificat…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
e03c520
docs(security): send the well-known URI in Signature-Agent, as the ed…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
96fd6a5
test(wba): say that a padded base64url scenario nonce contains - or _
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
a424bb2
docs(security): keep the bare-origin Signature-Agent of draft -00
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
a3c6ee6
docs(security): state the Signature-Agent value as a serialized https…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
49b3a31
docs(security): accept exactly one Signature-Agent string per origin
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
2546cf5
test(wba): accept type=directory as a Token or a String
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
9c3d9e6
Merge origin/main into docs/wba-profile-illustration
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
3b85ffc
test(wba): refuse a Signature-Agent that is not exactly an https orig…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
dde8f7e
docs(security): record a nonce only after the request verifies
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
f19abfd
fix(schema): give signing_profile no default, so it never lands next …
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
4778081
docs(security): name AUTH_INVALID as the error for a revoked key
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
b1de70d
docs(security): drop the stray comma in the vector README's test-key …
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
c385fc7
test(wba): grade the type rule, the unsigned directory, and three dir…
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
067ea62
test(wba): add four scenarios for rules that no scenario reached
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
f311e1b
docs(security): refuse a directory that publishes a private key member
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
84c6597
docs(security): compare private JWK member names without regard to case
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
e592947
test(wba): grade the case-insensitive private-member rule with D14c
KonstantinMirin Oct 18, 2026
01db90c
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into docs/wba-profile-illu…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
bbeee18
test(mcp): keep main's schema budget bounds; update only the definiti…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
1667e72
Merge branch 'main' into docs/wba-profile-illustration
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
8af4584
Merge branch 'main' into docs/wba-profile-illustration
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
0329126
docs(wba): use each directory key with a valid signature and ignore t…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
af6e3a5
docs(wba): mark the profile experimental in AdCP 3.3, adopted by DR-0023
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
4ac2b0f
docs(wba): point onboarding to R5 principal binding
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
32e3026
docs(wba): state the stale revocation list once, in Transport revocation
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
4bb811a
feat(wba): mark the signing profile fields experimental under signing…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
ff8874e
feat(wba): let every webhook registration select its signing profile,…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
3e9d1bb
test(wba): ignore a directory key without a valid signature in the sc…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
05fc3e7
Merge branch 'main' into docs/wba-profile-illustration
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
9f472d6
fix(wba): leave authentication required on reporting and artifact web…
KonstantinMirin Oct 19, 2026
0d6c3e6
docs(wba): say that signing_profile on reporting and artifact webhook…
KonstantinMirin Oct 20, 2026
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13 changes: 13 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/wba-request-signing-profile.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
---
"adcontextprotocol": minor
---

Add the Web Bot Auth request-signing profile, experimental in 3.3 and adopted by DR-0023, published alongside the AdCP RFC 9421 profile, which stays as written. The page `docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile.mdx` defines the profile: a signer names its origin in a covered `Signature-Agent` header, and the verifier resolves the signer's keys in one step from that origin's `/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory`. An identity is an origin with one key directory, every signing key is an Ed25519 key, `keyid` is the JWK thumbprint, and every signed request carries an RFC 9421 `nonce` of 64 bytes, as unpadded base64url or canonical padded base64, that the seller's verifier MUST check. Signature failures are reported with `400`, `403`, and `429`. A request carries exactly one `web-bot-auth` signature and one `Signature-Agent` member, and a verifier does not read signatures with other tags; a party that signs a request is its signer, and whether it may act for another party is answered by that party's `brand.json` or `trust.json`. A directory response is served with the `application/http-message-signatures-directory+json` media type and signed by each Ed25519 key it holds; a verifier uses each Ed25519 key with a valid signature, ignores every other key, and refuses a directory in which any key carries a private member. Webhooks under the profile are ordinary signed requests from the seller's identity. A governance agent is an identity like any other, on its own origin; JWS artifacts, such as governance tokens, are outside this profile. The profile selects options Web Bot Auth and RFC 9421 already define and adds nothing to the wire.

Two checks have no Web Bot Auth library behind them, so they live in the AdCP layer, in the `security.mdx` section "AdCP checks after Web Bot Auth verification": the identity's revocation list, signed by a key in the identity's directory with JWS `alg` `EdDSA`, and the `Accept-Signature` hint on a `403` or `429`, which is a SHOULD.

A verified identity the seller has not approved gets no account access, reads included. After approval, the identity maps to a principal and the principal to its accounts, so onboarding becomes approving a verified identity instead of issuing a credential.

Additive schema changes: `request_signing.profiles` and `webhook_signing.profiles` on `get_adcp_capabilities` let a seller say which signing profiles it accepts and emits, and an optional, experimental `signing_profile` on every webhook registration (`push-notification-config`, `notification-config`, `agent-notification-config`, `reporting-webhook`, and `artifact_webhook` on `create_media_buy`) lets a webhook subscriber select the profile it verifies; a registration that carries both `signing_profile` and `authentication` fails schema validation. `reporting_webhook` and `artifact_webhook` still require `authentication`, so `signing_profile` is usable there once adcontextprotocol/adcp#8177 makes `authentication` optional. Omitting every new field keeps the 3.0 to 3.2 behavior.

Adds the `wba-profile` conformance vectors: two positive vectors (single signer, signed directory response) and six negative vectors (missing nonce, replayed nonce, uncovered `Signature-Agent`, key absent from the named directory, unparseable header, two signatures on one request), each stating its expected status code. Adds `scenarios.json`, 49 failure scenarios as data that a harness signs at run time, each with its expected outcome and a tier that says whether a Web Bot Auth library alone gives that outcome or only the profile's rules do.
1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions docs/building/by-layer/L1/index.mdx
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -23,3 +23,4 @@ For the cumulative cross-layer story (what L0+L1 buys you), see the [SDK stack r
- **[Security implementation profile](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/security)** — RFC 9421 wire details, KMS integration, replay-window tuning.
- **[Portable attestations](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/security#portable-attestations)** — reference-first claim credentials, evaluator allowlists, safe resolution, verification outcomes, and action binding.
- **[Webhook verifier tuning](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/webhook-verifier-tuning)** — clock-skew handling, key-rotation transitions, signature failure diagnostics.
- **[Web Bot Auth request-signing profile](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile)** — experimental in 3.3, adopted by DR-0023: one key-resolution rule from the covered `Signature-Agent` header, identity as an origin, mandatory nonce checks, one signature per request, and status-code error responses.
31 changes: 31 additions & 0 deletions docs/building/by-layer/L1/security.mdx
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1606,6 +1606,37 @@ Operators SHOULD serve a single combined revocation list at the brand.json origi

Verifiers accepting request-signed mutations MUST poll the revocation list on the cadence declared in `next_update` (floor 1 min, ceiling 30 min). The fetch-failure safe-default applies with grace = 4× the previous polling interval: verifiers that have not refreshed within `next_update + grace` MUST reject new request-signed mutations with `request_signature_revocation_stale` until the list is refreshed.

#### AdCP checks after Web Bot Auth verification

<Note>
These checks belong to the [Web Bot Auth request-signing profile](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/wba-profile), which is experimental in AdCP 3.3, adopted by [DR-0023](https://github.com/adcontextprotocol/adcp/blob/main/governance/decisions/DR-0023-agent-identity-is-an-origin.md).
</Note>

A Web Bot Auth (WBA) verifier configured with the profile's rules decides whether a request is validly signed and which origin signed it. AdCP adds two checks that run after that verifier returns, each on a different outcome. The revocation-list check runs only after verification succeeds. The `Accept-Signature` field goes only on the verifier's `403` or `429` refusal. A standard WBA library does not perform them, so an implementation runs them in its AdCP layer. The WBA profile's conformance vectors do not grade them.

**Revocation list.** After WBA verification succeeds, the verifier checks the signing identity's revocation list, the list that [Transport revocation](#transport-revocation) defines. The following rules apply under the profile:

- The identity's origin serves the list, with the path and media type that Transport revocation uses. The verifier accepts the list only from that origin.
- A key in the identity's key directory signs the list, with the JWS `alg` `EdDSA`.
- Entries in `revoked_kids` are JWK thumbprints. The verifier matches them against the signature's `keyid`.

[Transport revocation](#transport-revocation) states the polling cadence and what a request gets when its key is revoked or the list is missing or stale.

The list lives on the same origin as the key directory. An outage that keeps a stale directory in use also leaves the list unrefreshed, so the safe default bounds how long a removed key commits spend during a discovery failure.

**`Accept-Signature` on a refusal.** When WBA verification refuses a request with `403` or `429`, the verifier SHOULD add an `Accept-Signature` field (RFC 9421 section 5.1). WBA section 5.3 lets an origin request a signature this way. The field names the label, the covered components, and the parameters the profile requires:

```http
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Accept-Signature: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "@authority" "content-type" \
"content-digest" "signature-agent";key="sig1");created;expires;nonce;ke\
yid;alg;tag="web-bot-auth"
```

On a `429`, the field SHOULD also carry a fresh `nonce` for the signer's next attempt. The verifier SHOULD add the same field to its answer to an unsigned request for an operation in `required_for`. A `400`, a revoked key, and an AdCP authorization error carry no `Accept-Signature`.

#### Transport capability advertisement

Verifiers advertise signing support and per-call requirements via the `request_signing` block on `get_adcp_capabilities`:
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