feat(relay): compute the bot role from the recorded agent owner

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ All database access. Uses `sqlx::query()` (runtime, not compile-time macros) —
 | `error.rs` | Database error types |
 
 **Channel types:** `Stream`, `Forum`, `Dm`, `Workflow`, `System`  
-**Member roles:** `Owner`, `Admin`, `Member`, `Guest`, `Bot`  
+**Member roles:** `Owner`, `Admin`, `Member`, `Guest`, `Bot` (`Bot` = `Member` permissions; the relay stores `member` and shows `bot` for keys with a recorded agent owner)  
 **Workflow statuses:** `Active`, `Disabled`, `Archived`  
 **Run statuses:** `Pending`, `Running`, `WaitingApproval`, `Completed`, `Failed`, `Cancelled`
 

NOSTR.md

@@ -101,6 +101,31 @@ relay to specific external Nostr identities without granting full access.
   SELECT encode(pubkey, 'hex'), added_at, note FROM pubkey_allowlist;
   ```
 
+### The bot role
+
+`bot` is a label, not a permission tier. It has the same permissions as
+`member`, and the relay chooses between the two:
+
+- When an add or role change ends at `member` or `bot`, the relay stores
+  `member`. It ignores which of the two the client asked for. Asking for the
+  other one is not a role change.
+- The relay shows an ordinary member as `bot` if the key has a recorded
+  agent owner, and as `member` otherwise, in kind:39002 rosters and every
+  other place it reports a role.
+- An agent owner is recorded once, by the first NIP-OA authentication, and
+  never changes. When it is recorded, the relay republishes the kind:39002
+  rosters of that key's channels so they show `bot`.
+- `owner`, `admin` and `guest` are stored and shown as asked.
+
+Clients follow three rules:
+
+- **Write:** send `member` for an ordinary member. The relay accepts `bot`
+  from older clients and stores the same role it would store for `member`.
+- **Parse:** read a `bot` role in a kind:39002 roster or kind:9000 as `member`
+  as soon as it is parsed. Do not keep `bot` as a separate client role.
+- **Identity:** never infer that a key is an agent from its channel role. A
+  key is an agent only when a verified NIP-OA attestation says so.
+
 ### Announce channels
 
 Roles have the same permissions in every channel. A channel's settings

crates/buzz-core/src/channel.rs

@@ -347,7 +347,13 @@ pub fn decide_member_put(put: MemberPut<'_>) -> Result<MemberRole, MemberPutDeni
         // No role tag: an active member keeps their role.
         return current.parse().map_err(|_| MemberPutDenial::RoleChange);
     };
-    if current == requested.as_str() {
+    // `member` and `bot` are one role: the relay stores `member` and shows
+    // `bot` when the target has a recorded agent owner, so asking for the
+    // other one is not a role change.
+    if current
+        .parse::<MemberRole>()
+        .is_ok_and(|current| current.is_same_role(requested))
+    {
         return Ok(requested);
     }
     // A stored role this build does not know is changed only by an elevated
@@ -439,7 +445,9 @@ impl FromStr for ChannelType {
 /// A member's role within a channel.
 ///
 /// The hierarchy for permission checks is: Owner > Admin > Member > Guest.
-/// Bot is a **separate designation** — it is not part of the linear hierarchy.
+/// Bot has the same permissions as Member. The relay stores `member` for
+/// both and shows `bot` for a key with a recorded agent owner, so the role
+/// only labels an owned agent; it grants and refuses nothing extra.
 /// Use [`MemberRole::permission_level`] for numeric comparisons in authorization.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum MemberRole {
@@ -451,7 +459,8 @@ pub enum MemberRole {
     Member,
     /// Read-only external participant.
     Guest,
-    /// Automated agent or integration (not in the role hierarchy).
+    /// A member whose key has a recorded agent owner. Same permissions as
+    /// [`MemberRole::Member`]; the relay computes it when it reads a role.
     Bot,
 }
 
@@ -472,6 +481,19 @@ impl MemberRole {
         matches!(self, Self::Owner | Self::Admin)
     }
 
+    /// Whether this is the ordinary member role, `member` or `bot`. A client
+    /// may send either; the relay shows `bot` exactly when the key has a
+    /// recorded agent owner.
+    pub fn is_ordinary_member(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, Self::Member | Self::Bot)
+    }
+
+    /// Whether `self` and `other` are the same role: equal, or both ordinary.
+    /// `member` and `bot` are one role shown with two labels.
+    pub fn is_same_role(self, other: MemberRole) -> bool {
+        self == other || (self.is_ordinary_member() && other.is_ordinary_member())
+    }
+
     /// Whether this role may write in a channel: post, react, edit, change
     /// topic, add people, push to git. The same in every channel: every role
     /// except [`MemberRole::Guest`] may, and a bot counts as a member.
@@ -504,21 +526,18 @@ impl MemberRole {
 
     /// Numeric permission level for authorization comparisons.
     ///
-    /// Higher = more privileged. Bot returns 0 (must use explicit grants).
+    /// Higher = more privileged. Bot has the same level as Member.
     /// Use `role.permission_level() >= required.permission_level()` for checks.
     pub fn permission_level(self) -> u8 {
         match self {
             Self::Owner => 4,
             Self::Admin => 3,
-            Self::Member => 2,
+            Self::Member | Self::Bot => 2,
             Self::Guest => 1,
-            Self::Bot => 0,
         }
     }
 
     /// Returns true if this role meets or exceeds the required role's permission level.
-    ///
-    /// Bot never meets any requirement (returns false for all non-Bot requirements).
     pub fn has_at_least(self, required: MemberRole) -> bool {
         self.permission_level() >= required.permission_level()
     }
@@ -759,6 +778,32 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn bot_has_the_member_permission_level() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            MemberRole::Bot.permission_level(),
+            MemberRole::Member.permission_level()
+        );
+        for required in [
+            MemberRole::Owner,
+            MemberRole::Admin,
+            MemberRole::Member,
+            MemberRole::Guest,
+            MemberRole::Bot,
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                MemberRole::Bot.has_at_least(required),
+                MemberRole::Member.has_at_least(required),
+                "{required}"
+            );
+        }
+        assert!(MemberRole::Bot.is_ordinary_member());
+        assert!(MemberRole::Member.is_ordinary_member());
+        for role in [MemberRole::Owner, MemberRole::Admin, MemberRole::Guest] {
+            assert!(!role.is_ordinary_member(), "{role}");
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn only_guests_cannot_post() {
         for role in [

crates/buzz-core/src/git_perms.rs

@@ -345,8 +345,9 @@ pub fn parse_protection_tag_with_warnings(
                 .parse()
                 .map_err(|_| RuleParseError::InvalidRole(role_str.to_string()))?;
             // Reject push:bot and push:guest — nonsensical rules.
-            // Bot is promoted to Member at the policy layer; push:bot is meaningless.
-            // Guest cannot push regardless; push:guest would be confusing.
+            // Bot has the member permission level, so push:bot would mean
+            // push:member. Guest cannot push regardless; push:guest would be
+            // confusing.
             if matches!(role, MemberRole::Bot | MemberRole::Guest) {
                 return Err(RuleParseError::InvalidRole(role_str.to_string()));
             }
@@ -931,19 +932,25 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn evaluate_bot_cannot_push_without_explicit_grant() {
+    fn evaluate_bot_pushes_like_a_member() {
         let rules = vec![];
-        let update = RefUpdate {
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/feature".to_string(),
-            kind: UpdateKind::FastForward,
-            old_oid: "a".repeat(40),
-            new_oid: "b".repeat(40),
-        };
-        // Bot has permission_level 0 at the core evaluator level.
-        // NOTE: The policy layer (policy.rs) promotes Bot → Member before calling
-        // evaluate_push, so bots in a channel CAN push in practice. This test
-        // verifies the raw evaluator behavior; the promotion is tested in policy.
-        assert!(evaluate_ref_update(&update, MemberRole::Bot, &rules).is_err());
+        for (ref_name, kind) in [
+            ("refs/heads/feature", UpdateKind::FastForward),
+            ("refs/heads/feature", UpdateKind::NonFastForward),
+            ("refs/heads/main", UpdateKind::FastForward),
+        ] {
+            let update = RefUpdate {
+                ref_name: ref_name.to_string(),
+                kind,
+                old_oid: "a".repeat(40),
+                new_oid: "b".repeat(40),
+            };
+            assert_eq!(
+                evaluate_ref_update(&update, MemberRole::Bot, &rules).is_ok(),
+                evaluate_ref_update(&update, MemberRole::Member, &rules).is_ok(),
+                "{ref_name} {kind:?}"
+            );
+        }
     }
 
     #[test]

crates/buzz-db/src/runtime/migration.rs

@@ -777,14 +777,27 @@ mod postgres_tests {
         let mut migrations: Vec<_> = MIGRATOR.iter().collect();
         migrations.sort_by_key(|migration| migration.version);
 
-        assert_eq!(migrations.len(), 80);
+        assert_eq!(migrations.len(), 81);
         for (index, migration) in migrations.iter().enumerate() {
             assert_eq!(migration.version, (index + 1) as i64);
         }
         assert!(migrations[79]
             .sql
             .as_str()
             .contains("ADD COLUMN auto_join BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false"));
+        assert_eq!(migrations[80].version, 81);
+        let retire_roster_fence = strip_sql_comments(migrations[80].sql.as_str());
+        for statement in [
+            "SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '1s';",
+            "SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '5s';",
+            "DROP TRIGGER trg_events_guard_channel_roster_snapshot ON events;",
+            "DROP FUNCTION guard_channel_roster_snapshot();",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                retire_roster_fence.contains(statement),
+                "0081 must run {statement}"
+            );
+        }
         assert!(migrations[70]
             .sql
             .as_str()
@@ -1336,31 +1349,8 @@ mod postgres_tests {
         assert!(roster_fence.contains("snapshot_members IS DISTINCT FROM canonical_members"));
         assert!(roster_fence.contains("ERRCODE = '23514'"));
 
-        // Fresh desired-state bootstrap must install the identical executable
-        // fence as migration 0032. CI and isolated relay startup use schema.sql
-        // without running migrations, so drift reopens rolling-deploy races.
-        // The desired state keeps the function and its trigger in separate
-        // files, so compare each statement rather than one contiguous span.
-        fn extract_span<'a>(sql: &'a str, start: &str, end: &str) -> &'a str {
-            let begin = sql.find(start).expect("span start");
-            let relative_end = sql[begin..].find(end).expect("span end");
-            &sql[begin..begin + relative_end + end.len()]
-        }
-        for (start, end) in [
-            (
-                "CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION guard_channel_roster_snapshot()",
-                "$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;",
-            ),
-            (
-                "CREATE TRIGGER trg_events_guard_channel_roster_snapshot",
-                "    FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION guard_channel_roster_snapshot();",
-            ),
-        ] {
-            assert_eq!(
-                extract_span(roster_fence, start, end),
-                extract_span(&desired_schema, start, end)
-            );
-        }
+        // Migration 0081 retires this fence; the desired state never installs it.
+        assert!(!desired_schema.contains("guard_channel_roster_snapshot"));
 
         // The single-row heartbeat table is updated continuously. Prevent
         // autovacuum from truncating its heap so standby queries are not