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feat/OIDC auth - #93
matthiasbaldi wants to merge 3 commits into
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cloudlena
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Many thanks for the big PR, @matthiasbaldi! I left some comments.
| viper.SetDefault("PORT", "8080") | ||
| viper.SetDefault("TIMEOUT", 600) | ||
| viper.SetDefault("AUTH_PROVIDER", auth.ProviderNone) | ||
| viper.SetDefault("AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ROLE", "viewer") |
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This default should be "writer". Both the README ("defaults to writer, which is the historical behaviour") and the doc comment on Config.AnonymousRole ("It is RoleWriter by default … exactly as before authentication existed") say so.
As written, an existing install upgrading with no auth env vars set and the default ALLOW_DELETE=true gets RoleViewer on every request: effectiveOptions clears AllowDelete so the delete UI disappears, and auth.RequireRole(auth.RoleWriter) returns 403 for create-bucket, upload/create-object, bulk-delete, delete-object, delete-bucket and put-policy. The app silently becomes read-only with no configuration change.
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| // Authenticate grants every request the same identity. | ||
| func (a *anonymous) Authenticate(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) (*Identity, bool) { | ||
| return a.identity, true |
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AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ROLE=none doesn't actually deny access. This always returns (identity, true), and no read route carries a RequireRole(RoleViewer) guard — only the mutating routes are guarded.
So an operator who sets AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ROLE=none to lock the app down (reasonable, given RoleNone is documented as "no access at all" and OIDC_DEFAULT_ROLE=none "denies access") still gets a fully browsable, fully downloadable app — only writes are blocked. Either reject none for the anonymous provider at start-up, or guard the read routes with RequireRole(RoleViewer).
| func effectiveOptions(ctx context.Context, opts Options) Options { | ||
| isWriter := auth.RoleFrom(ctx) >= auth.RoleWriter | ||
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| opts.AllowDelete = opts.AllowDelete && isWriter |
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Only AllowDelete is narrowed here, but the templates render the other write affordances unconditionally: "Upload files" (bucket.html.tmpl:368), "Upload folder" (374), "Create folder" (381) and the bucket-policy save, plus "Create bucket" (buckets.html.tmpl:55, 65).
A RoleViewer user therefore sees all of them, and each click hits a writer(...)-guarded route and pops a 403 toast. The design note added to CLAUDE.md says every capability is ANDed with the role, but only this one is — a CanWrite/AllowCreate flag threaded into both page data structs and the templates is still missing.
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| return &sessionStore{ | ||
| store: sessions.NewCookieStore(key, key), |
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SESSION_MAX_AGE is never enforced server side. sessions.NewCookieStore sets each securecookie codec's max age to 86400*30 (30 days), and the code only ever assigns session.Options — store.MaxAge(...) is never called.
So the MaxAge in cookieOptions is just a browser cookie attribute: a session cookie lifted out of a browser (or replayed by a tool that ignores cookie expiry) is still accepted for 30 days even with the 8 h default, and a SESSION_MAX_AGE above 30 days silently stops working at day 30. Same applies to the 10-minute loginMaxAge on the login-state cookie.
| keySubject: identity.Subject, | ||
| keyName: identity.Name, | ||
| keyEmail: identity.Email, | ||
| keyGroups: identity.Groups, |
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Suggest dropping keyGroups. Identity.Groups is never read after login — only a.role(...) uses it, at callback time, before the session is saved.
Meanwhile securecookie's maxLength is 4096, so a user in a large directory (a few hundred AD/Keycloak groups) makes session.Save return errEncodedValueTooLong; saveIdentity propagates it and handleCallback answers 500 "Login failed: error opening session". Removing the claim removes the failure mode at no cost.
| func (a *oidcAuthenticator) RegisterRoutes(router *mux.Router) { | ||
| router.HandleFunc(LoginPath, a.handleLogin).Methods(http.MethodGet) | ||
| router.HandleFunc(CallbackPath, a.handleCallback).Methods(http.MethodGet) | ||
| router.HandleFunc(LogoutPath, a.handleLogout).Methods(http.MethodGet, http.MethodPost) |
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Logout accepts GET and is rendered as a plain <a href> (layout.html.tmpl:171), which makes it CSRF-able: any third-party page — or a link prefetcher / corporate link scanner — can log the user out with <img src="https://s3manager.example.com/auth/logout">.
Restricting handleLogout to POST and making the template a small form closes it.
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Adds an optional authentication layer in front of the web app, independent of the S3 credentials used against the storage backend: - internal/app/s3manager/auth: Authenticator extension point, with NewAnonymous (AUTH_PROVIDER=none, default) and an OIDC implementation using coreos/go-oidc and x/oauth2 (authorization code flow + PKCE + nonce). The resulting Identity lives in an encrypted, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookie so the app stays stateless. - permissions.go: effectiveOptions ANDs each capability with the caller's role and never assigns from it, so a role can only narrow the deployer's configured Options, never grant beyond them. Routes a deployment disables (e.g. ALLOW_DELETE=false) are not registered at all, regardless of any role. - main.go / layout.html.tmpl: wires the middleware and login/logout routes, and adds a user chip plus logout link next to the existing instance switcher. Also extends BUCKET_NAME to accept a comma-separated list of buckets, in addition to a single name, for deployments that need to expose more than one bucket through the same instance. This stays a display filter only, as it already was upstream. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A leading backslash such as /\evil.example is not caught by the existing // check, but some browsers normalize it to a protocol relative URL and follow it off-site. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Default AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ROLE to writer so upgrades keep full access - Refuse AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ROLE=none at start-up and require at least the viewer role on every app route - Hide create, upload and policy-save actions from viewers - Enforce SESSION_MAX_AGE and the login-state max age server side - Keep groups out of the session cookie - Accept logout only via POST and render it as a form Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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This Pullrequest enables the s3Manager to get protected directly with its own security layer via OIDC.
Maybe it would be further expandable as the issue #3 asks for. Currently for our usecase for SSO.
In this PR are includes one feature and one change - I could split if you wish: