We take security bugs in Opik seriously, and we appreciate the work of researchers who report them responsibly. This document explains how to reach us privately and what happens after you do.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues, discussions, or pull requests.
Report them through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. The report is visible only to you and the Opik maintainers, and we use that advisory to discuss details, develop a fix, and coordinate public disclosure with you.
If you are unable to use GitHub Security Advisories, email support@comet.com.
The more of this you can provide, the faster we can triage:
- The type of issue (SSRF, RCE, path traversal, injection, auth bypass, ...)
- The affected component and version or commit, and whether it is the backend, frontend, an SDK, or the Helm chart / Docker Compose deployment
- Any configuration required to reproduce it — in particular, whether authentication was enabled
- Step-by-step reproduction instructions, and proof-of-concept code if you have it
- The impact, and how you think an attacker would use it
We will acknowledge your report, assess it, and keep you updated as we work on a fix. How long that takes depends on the severity and complexity of the issue.
We will credit you in the published advisory unless you prefer to remain anonymous. Please give us a chance to ship a fix before disclosing publicly.
Opik runs in several configurations, and they do not share a threat model. All of them are in scope for this policy — report anything you find in any of them — but please read the note on open-source deployments before filing.
| Deployment | In scope |
|---|---|
Opik Cloud (comet.com) |
Yes |
| Opik self-hosted, Enterprise | Yes |
| Opik self-hosted, open source | Yes, with the caveat below |
| Opik SDKs and integrations | Yes |
Open-source Opik ships with authentication disabled (AUTH_ENABLED=false), and
authentication methods — SAML, OIDC, JWT — are
an Enterprise feature that is not available in open-source deployments.
A stock docker compose or Helm install therefore serves every request as a fully
authorized user of the default workspace.
This is a deliberate default for local and trusted-network use, not an oversight. Do not expose an open-source Opik deployment directly to the internet. Place it behind your own authenticating reverse proxy, VPN, or network boundary, and treat anyone who can reach the API as an administrator of that instance.
Consequently, a report whose substance is "an internet-exposed open-source install requires no login" describes this documented default, and we will close it as such. A report of a specific flaw that an attacker can reach in that configuration — server-side request forgery, remote code execution, path traversal, injection, deserialization, or access to data across workspace boundaries — is a vulnerability, is in scope, and we want to hear about it.
Opik releases frequently, and security fixes land in the next release rather than being backported. Only the latest release is supported. We strongly recommend tracking the most recent release to receive security updates.
For Comet's certifications, subprocessors, and security documentation, see the Comet Trust Center.