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claude-triagedIssue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.Issue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.enhancementNew feature or requestNew feature or requestmember-toolsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, eventsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, eventsneeds-wg-reviewBlocked on a working-group decision — surface in WG meeting agendasBlocked on a working-group decision — surface in WG meeting agendaswebsiteAny issues related to the websiteAny issues related to the website
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Description
Problem
Admin credential linking exists, but a person cannot safely establish and manage their own durable recovery path before losing a work email. Job-change continuity still depends on manual intervention if the work credential disappears first.
Scope
- Add a self-service account-settings flow to add a verified personal/recovery email as another WorkOS credential on the same identity.
- Require proof of control of the current session and the target email; use step-up authentication for destructive credential changes.
- List verified credentials, their primary/recovery state, and last-used metadata without exposing them publicly.
- Allow a person to promote a verified credential and remove a non-primary credential.
- Prevent removal of the last usable credential and handle pending, expired, replayed, and concurrently claimed links atomically.
- Retire or reconcile the legacy
user_email_aliasesrepresentation so the UI reflects real WorkOS credentials. - Surface a proactive reminder when a person has only a work-domain credential; do not wait until employer access is already gone.
Invariants
- Email similarity, domain, name, or employer is never sufficient to link identities.
- Credential linking never copies or grants organization memberships, seats, roles, or entitlements.
- A target credential already bound to another identity requires the explicit, audited merge/split path in Admin identity merge/split: make credential linking genuinely reversible #6490.
- Session and bearer-token caches are invalidated after bind, unlink, or promote.
- Credential changes are fully audited without logging tokens or unnecessary personal data.
Acceptance criteria
- A person can add and verify a personal recovery credential and subsequently sign in through it.
- Both sides of an existing-account link prove control before identities are joined.
- Removal refuses the primary/last usable credential until another is promoted.
- Expiry, replay, TOCTOU, concurrent claim, and cross-account abuse tests pass.
- Losing an organization membership removes organization access but leaves the verified personal sign-in and person-owned state intact.
- The account UI and recovery messaging are covered by end-to-end tests.
Out of scope
- Personal subscription purchase or fallback entitlements
- Employment affiliation history
- Fuzzy or automatic merging
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claude-triagedIssue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.Issue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.enhancementNew feature or requestNew feature or requestmember-toolsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, eventsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, eventsneeds-wg-reviewBlocked on a working-group decision — surface in WG meeting agendasBlocked on a working-group decision — surface in WG meeting agendaswebsiteAny issues related to the websiteAny issues related to the website
Activity
bokelley commentedon Aug 24, 2026
Triage
Classification: Feature request
Bucket(s): security-sensitive, admin/ops tools (member-tools)
Status: ready-for-human
Milestone: Evergreen (already set)
What the experts said:
PUT /primaryskipsinvalidateSessionsForUsersin current code, violating the stated invariant; (3) the 409 on cross-account claim enumerates alias membership. Significant concerns: MCP OAuth refresh tokens not covered by session invalidation; alias retirement needs per-user migration flag + dual-write strategy.account-linking.ts; Admin identity merge/split: make credential linking genuinely reversible #6490 boundary already enforced in code. Alias retirement should be sequenced last as its own workstream. Proactive reminder needs a concrete surface decision before implementation.My take: The feature solves real pain and the code foundation is there. Three security design decisions need WG sign-off before work starts — particularly the step-up scope for ADD, which changes the security posture meaningfully.
@bokelley, your call on each:
Decision 1 — Step-up scope for ADD (highest risk):
Option A — same step-up as REMOVE/PROMOTE (closes stolen-session backdoor):
Option B — OTP to target email only, no re-auth challenge (matches most consumer recovery flows):
Option A is the safer default; B is acceptable only if a post-bind notification to the existing credential is mandatory.
Decision 2 — Cross-account 409 shape (enumeration side-channel):
The current code path must become constant-time and non-disclosing.
Decision 3 — MCP OAuth token scope on credential change:
After bind or promote, should long-lived MCP OAuth refresh tokens issued to third-party agents be revoked or flagged for re-consent? Session-cookie invalidation does not reach these. (Check
mcp_oauth_state_db.tsand migration 195/538.)Triaged by Claude Code. Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fy9EXkXaFqCmfStgbn5wyq
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