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addieIssues related to Addie (via any channel)Issues related to Addie (via any channel)claude-triagedIssue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.Issue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.member-toolsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, eventsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, events
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Why
A person must keep their community profile, reputation, and access to their own account when their login email or employer changes. A WorkOS user is a sign-in credential, not the durable owner of person-level state.
The identity foundation now exists, but much application state is still physically keyed to the identity's primary workos_user_id. Auth hides that coupling by routing non-primary credentials to the primary user. That works for sign-in, but it leaves profile/reputation portability, recovery, deletion, and split behavior dependent on whichever credential happens to be primary.
What has shipped
- feat(identity): identity layer foundation (Phase 1) #3711 —
identities+identity_workos_users; singleton backfill and auth resolution - feat(identity): rewrite mergeUsers to bind, don't delete (Phase 2a) #3715 — account linking binds both WorkOS users instead of deleting the secondary; non-primary sign-ins route to the canonical user
- feat(identity): admin "bind sign-in email" tool (Phase 2b) — fixes Ahmed #3722 — admin creates and binds an additional sign-in email
- feat(identity): admin link-existing + unlink credential — fixes Ahmed + Pia (#291) #3744 — admin links and unlinks existing WorkOS credentials
- feat(identity): admin "promote credential to primary" #4059 — admin promotes a different credential to primary
- fix(security): handle WorkOS user.deleted for primary-bound users (#3718) #4617 — primary-credential deletion promotes a surviving credential
These are meaningful foundations, but they do not yet make identity_id the owner of portable application state.
Invariants
identityis the durable person identifier across credentials and jobs. It may still be deleted or anonymized under the applicable data-retention policy.- WorkOS users and verified email addresses are credentials/identifiers. Linking them never grants organization access.
- Organization memberships, roles, seats, API access, and employer-paid entitlements remain organization-scoped and authorize only the authenticated credential explicitly granted access.
- Person-owned profile and reputation state resolves by
identity_id, not by whichever WorkOS user is primary. - Credentials, certifications, billing records, consent, conversations, and audit events retain source provenance even when shown in one person view.
- Linking requires proof of control of both sides. Emergency recovery may prepare a pending binding, but cannot activate it before subject confirmation. No fuzzy auto-linking.
- Unlink/split behavior is designed before portable records are collapsed irreversibly.
Remaining workstreams
- Person identity: define ownership, provenance, and lifecycle of portable state #6487 — classify state ownership, provenance, deletion, and split behavior
- Identity linking: isolate organization authorization to the authenticated credential #6827 — isolate organization authorization to the authenticated credential
- Person identity storage: migrate portable profile state off canonical WorkOS user #6488 — migrate portable profile state off the canonical WorkOS user
- Person identity: make community reputation portable with provenance #6816 — person reputation migration: community points, badges, and journey status with provenance
- Person identity: add self-service verified recovery credentials #6817 — self-service recovery credentials: verified add/remove/promote flow
- Identity privacy fence: consent and authorization rules for cross-surface linking #6491 — approve the cross-surface privacy fence
- Admin identity merge/split: make credential linking genuinely reversible #6490 — finish guarded merge/split with immutable, reversible provenance
- Addie MemberContext: collapse linked identities without leaking cross-org data #6489 — hydrate and format MemberContext without cross-org or cross-surface leakage
Delivery order
- Approve the ownership/provenance matrix and privacy fence.
- Isolate organization authorization to the authenticated credential (Identity linking: isolate organization authorization to the authenticated credential #6827).
- Land the immutable operation/source-provenance substrate and disable destructive consolidation.
- Ship state-empty self-service recovery credentials without changing entitlements.
- Migrate profile state, then reputation state, using bounded dual-read/dual-write rollouts.
- Finish reversible split behavior.
- Move MemberContext onto the person-owned read model.
Done state
- Signing in through any linked credential yields the same person-owned profile and reputation.
- Losing or removing a work credential does not remove person-owned state or the person's remaining sign-in path.
- Removing an organization membership immediately removes that organization's access; identity linkage does not preserve it.
- Link, unlink, merge, split, deletion, and concurrent-claim tests pass without lost or duplicated portable state.
- Every field shown in a person view or Addie context has a documented owner and source.
Related, but separate
- Umbrella: person continuity across jobs, affiliations, and personal membership #6814 — umbrella for person continuity across jobs
- Personal subscription continuity across employer and credential changes #6818 — personal subscription continuity; does not make identity an organization entitlement source
- Affiliations and job-transition UX without authorization coupling #6819 — affiliations and job-transition UX; affiliations never grant access
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addieIssues related to Addie (via any channel)Issues related to Addie (via any channel)claude-triagedIssue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.Issue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.member-toolsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, eventsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, events
Activity
bokelley commentedon Apr 30, 2026
Triage
Classification: Feature request — multi-workstream identity architecture
Bucket(s): addie, admin / ops tools, security-sensitive
Status: deferred
Blocked-on: #3589 — resurfaces on merge.
Epic-shaped (5 workstreams: spec amendment, DB junction-table migration,
member-context.tscollapse, person-merge admin tool, GDPR cross-identity privacy fence). Item 5 touches GDPR consent contexts and cross-surface data exposure, which is security-sensitive; details withheld from this comment. When #3589 lands, @bokelley recommend converting this to a tracked epic with a child-issue task list before picking up individual workstreams — the privacy fence design decision in particular needs explicit human sign-off before execution.Triaged by Claude Code. Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PUaMq6hHSMu7mfeGW1gVPm
Generated by Claude Code
bokelley commentedon Aug 13, 2026
Converted the identity architecture into five sub-issues:
The model and privacy fence must land before storage or prompt-context convergence.
[-]Relationship model: support persons with multiple WorkOS users / Stripe customers / Slack IDs[/-][+]Person identity and portable state: profiles, emails, points, and recovery[/+]bokelley commentedon Aug 24, 2026
Refreshed this epic against the live implementation and attached the remaining work as sub-issues.
The identity/credential foundation is already shipped through #3711, #3715, #3722, #3744, #4059, and #4617. The remaining gap is that portable application state is still largely keyed to the identity's canonical WorkOS user.
The delivery order is now:
PR #6820 starts the first item by making the ownership, conflict, entitlement, provenance, deletion, and split rules explicit.