Skip to content

Person identity and portable state: profiles, emails, points, and recovery #3590

Open
1 of 8 issues completed

Description

@bokelley

Why

A person must keep their community profile, reputation, and access to their own account when their login email or employer changes. A WorkOS user is a sign-in credential, not the durable owner of person-level state.

The identity foundation now exists, but much application state is still physically keyed to the identity's primary workos_user_id. Auth hides that coupling by routing non-primary credentials to the primary user. That works for sign-in, but it leaves profile/reputation portability, recovery, deletion, and split behavior dependent on whichever credential happens to be primary.

What has shipped

These are meaningful foundations, but they do not yet make identity_id the owner of portable application state.

Invariants

  • identity is the durable person identifier across credentials and jobs. It may still be deleted or anonymized under the applicable data-retention policy.
  • WorkOS users and verified email addresses are credentials/identifiers. Linking them never grants organization access.
  • Organization memberships, roles, seats, API access, and employer-paid entitlements remain organization-scoped and authorize only the authenticated credential explicitly granted access.
  • Person-owned profile and reputation state resolves by identity_id, not by whichever WorkOS user is primary.
  • Credentials, certifications, billing records, consent, conversations, and audit events retain source provenance even when shown in one person view.
  • Linking requires proof of control of both sides. Emergency recovery may prepare a pending binding, but cannot activate it before subject confirmation. No fuzzy auto-linking.
  • Unlink/split behavior is designed before portable records are collapsed irreversibly.

Remaining workstreams

Delivery order

  1. Approve the ownership/provenance matrix and privacy fence.
  2. Isolate organization authorization to the authenticated credential (Identity linking: isolate organization authorization to the authenticated credential #6827).
  3. Land the immutable operation/source-provenance substrate and disable destructive consolidation.
  4. Ship state-empty self-service recovery credentials without changing entitlements.
  5. Migrate profile state, then reputation state, using bounded dual-read/dual-write rollouts.
  6. Finish reversible split behavior.
  7. Move MemberContext onto the person-owned read model.

Done state

  • Signing in through any linked credential yields the same person-owned profile and reputation.
  • Losing or removing a work credential does not remove person-owned state or the person's remaining sign-in path.
  • Removing an organization membership immediately removes that organization's access; identity linkage does not preserve it.
  • Link, unlink, merge, split, deletion, and concurrent-claim tests pass without lost or duplicated portable state.
  • Every field shown in a person view or Addie context has a documented owner and source.

Related, but separate

Activity

  1. added
    addieIssues related to Addie (via any channel)
    member-toolsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, events
    claude-triagingTriage routine is actively working on this issue (1-3 min)
    on Apr 30, 2026
  2. bokelley commented on Apr 30, 2026

    @bokelley
    ContributorAuthor

    Triage

    Classification: Feature request — multi-workstream identity architecture
    Bucket(s): addie, admin / ops tools, security-sensitive
    Status: deferred

    Blocked-on: #3589 — resurfaces on merge.

    Epic-shaped (5 workstreams: spec amendment, DB junction-table migration, member-context.ts collapse, person-merge admin tool, GDPR cross-identity privacy fence). Item 5 touches GDPR consent contexts and cross-surface data exposure, which is security-sensitive; details withheld from this comment. When #3589 lands, @bokelley recommend converting this to a tracked epic with a child-issue task list before picking up individual workstreams — the privacy fence design decision in particular needs explicit human sign-off before execution.


    Triaged by Claude Code. Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PUaMq6hHSMu7mfeGW1gVPm


    Generated by Claude Code

  3. added
    claude-triagedIssue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.
    and removed
    claude-triagingTriage routine is actively working on this issue (1-3 min)
    on Apr 30, 2026
  4. added this to the Evergreen milestone on May 17, 2026
  5. bokelley commented on Aug 13, 2026

    @bokelley
    ContributorAuthor

    Converted the identity architecture into five sub-issues:

    The model and privacy fence must land before storage or prompt-context convergence.

  6. changed the title [-]Relationship model: support persons with multiple WorkOS users / Stripe customers / Slack IDs[/-] [+]Person identity and portable state: profiles, emails, points, and recovery[/+] on Aug 24, 2026
  7. bokelley commented on Aug 24, 2026

    @bokelley
    ContributorAuthor

    Refreshed this epic against the live implementation and attached the remaining work as sub-issues.

    The identity/credential foundation is already shipped through #3711, #3715, #3722, #3744, #4059, and #4617. The remaining gap is that portable application state is still largely keyed to the identity's canonical WorkOS user.

    The delivery order is now:

    1. ownership/provenance contract (Person identity: define ownership, provenance, and lifecycle of portable state #6487) and privacy fence (Identity privacy fence: consent and authorization rules for cross-surface linking #6491)
    2. self-service recovery credentials (Person identity: add self-service verified recovery credentials #6817)
    3. identity-owned profile (Person identity storage: migrate portable profile state off canonical WorkOS user #6488) and reputation (Person identity: make community reputation portable with provenance #6816) migrations
    4. genuinely reversible merge/split (Admin identity merge/split: make credential linking genuinely reversible #6490)
    5. privacy-aware MemberContext convergence (Addie MemberContext: collapse linked identities without leaking cross-org data #6489)

    PR #6820 starts the first item by making the ownership, conflict, entitlement, provenance, deletion, and split rules explicit.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

No one assigned

    Labels

    addieIssues related to Addie (via any channel)claude-triagedIssue has been triaged by the Claude Code triage routine. Remove to re-triage.member-toolsAll member tools - profiles, dashboards, content management, working groups, events

    Type

    No type

    Projects

    No projects

      Relationships

      None yet

      Development

      No branches or pull requests

      Issue actions